September 26, 2025|Publications
September 26, 2025 | United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas | Unpublished Opinion
Executive Summary
In an unpublished opinion, Judge Drew B. Tipton of the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of Christian Brothers Automotive Corporation (“Christian Brothers”), a faith-based franchisor that requires all franchisees to be practicing Christians. Plaintiff Evan Domanic, who described himself as ethnically and religiously Jewish, alleged that Christian Brothers refused to grant him a franchise because of his Jewish ancestry, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Christian Brothers maintained that its decision was based solely on religion, consistent with its long-standing Christian-only franchise policy. The court held that Section 1981 “prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts,” not religious discrimination, and that “no reasonable jury could find that Domanic’s race, rather than his religion, was the reason he was denied a franchise opportunity.” Domanic v. Christian Bros. Auto. Corp., No. 4:22-cv-00386, 2025 WL 2774235, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2025). The decision does not endorse or condemn the franchisor’s policy but clarifies that faith-based ownership requirements do not violate federal civil rights law unless religion is used as a pretext for racial exclusion.
Relevant Background
According to the pleadings and the court’s opinion, Christian Brothers “describes itself as a ‘Christian faith-based franchisor of auto repair stores.’” Id. at 1. The company operates more than 250 franchise locations nationwide and imposes one “non-negotiable requirement: It only grants franchises to Christians.” Id. It has “granted over 250 franchise contracts to racially and ethnically diverse applicants—including some who are ethnically Jewish—but has never awarded a franchise to a non-Christian.” Id.
Plaintiff Evan Domanic alleged that he became interested in opening a Christian Brothers franchise after visiting one of its repair shops as a customer. Id. He applied to operate a location in Dripping Springs, Texas, in October 2020 and began the company’s eight-step franchise application process, which includes multiple interviews, financial disclosures, and in-person meetings. Id. at 1–2.
During one of the early application calls, Domanic stated that a Christian Brothers representative asked him whether he was “a man of faith.” Id. at 2. Domanic replied that he was Jewish and asked if that would disqualify him. Id. He alleged that the representative assured him that his religion “would not be an issue.” Id. Approximately two weeks later, Christian Brothers informed him that it was ending his application. Id. Christian Brothers asserted that it made this decision pursuant to its “longstanding policy of only partnering with Christians.” Id.
Fifteen months later, Domanic filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging that Christian Brothers’ refusal to continue the franchise application process constituted unlawful race-based discrimination. Id. Christian Brothers moved for summary judgment, arguing that the decision was based on religion, not race, and that Section 1981 does not prohibit religious distinctions. Id.
Decision
Judge Tipton began by reiterating that Section 1981 “prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts.” Id. at 3 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976)). The court explained that Section 1981 protects “identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics,” and that “such discrimination is racial discrimination that Congress intended § 1981 to forbid.” Id. (quoting Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987)). However, the court emphasized that Section 1981 “does not protect against religious discrimination.” Id. (quoting Sibley v. Touro LCMC Health, No. 24-30189, 2024 WL 5118489, at *4 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2024)).
The court acknowledged that Jewish ancestry may constitute a racial or ethnic classification under Section 1981, citing the Supreme Court’s holding in Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617–18 (1987), that Jews were “among the peoples then considered to be distinct races and hence within the protection of the statute.” Domanic, 2025 WL 2774235, at 3. Nonetheless, the court stated that a plaintiff “must still show that the alleged discrimination was based on his racial or ethnic identity, not his religious beliefs.” Id.
Applying the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the court held that Domanic met his initial burden to establish a prima facie case by showing that he is Jewish, disclosed his religion, and was rejected soon afterward. Domanic, 2025 WL 2774235, at 5. The court noted that “this close temporal proximity supports an inference of causation.” Id. (citing Garcia v. Prof’l Contract Servs., Inc., 938 F.3d 236, 243 (5th Cir. 2019)).
Christian Brothers articulated what the court described as a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for declining to contract with Domanic: its longstanding policy of offering franchise opportunities only to Christians in alignment with its faith-based mission.” Id. at 6. The company’s evidence showed that its Christian-only policy had been consistently applied across all applicants and that “it has never granted a franchise to a non-Christian in its 40-year history.” Id.
At the pretext stage, the court held that Domanic “has not met that burden.” Id. The plaintiff argued that discrimination against him for being Jewish was inseparable from discrimination based on Jewish ethnicity. Id. The court rejected that argument, explaining that “a plaintiff cannot establish pretext merely by asserting that the employer’s stated religious rationale is itself impermissible under Section 1981. That’s because Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination—not religious discrimination.” Id. (citing Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 606, 613; Runyon, 427 U.S. at 167). The court further observed that “it is not enough to argue that discrimination based on Judaism as a religion is inherently tied to Jewish ethnicity.” Id. “Just as Section 1981 distinguishes between race and religion, the Supreme Court distinguishes between Judaism as a religion and being Jewish as an ethnicity.” Id. (citing Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 617–18).
The court noted that Domanic “offers no evidence that Christian Brothers Auto’s faith-based policy was a façade selectively enforced to exclude him because of his race.” Id. Instead, the record showed that the company had awarded franchises “to individuals of Jewish ancestry who are Christians.” Id. at 6–7. The court concluded that “this record undercuts any inference that the Christian-only requirement was used to exclude Domanic based on his ethnicity rather than his faith.” Id. at 7.
Addressing one statement by a company representative who allegedly told Domanic that religion would not matter, the court found that “a single disputed remark by a non-decisionmaker does not create a genuine issue of material fact on pretext.” Id. (citing Eyob v. Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift Am. Inc., No. 4:16-CV-01688, 2017 WL 3215171, at *8 (S.D. Tex. July 28, 2017)). In concluding, Judge Tipton wrote that “Christian Brothers Auto has presented ample evidence that it applies its religious policy consistently. Its application materials and supporting evidence repeatedly emphasize that the company is a Christian faith-based organization. … No reasonable jury could conclude that Domanic’s race—rather than his religion—foreclosed his future as a Christian Brothers franchisee.” Id.
Looking Forward
The Domanic decision delineates the boundary between race and religion under Section 1981 and marks one of the few cases to apply that distinction in the context of franchise ownership. While the court accepted the plaintiff’s factual allegations, it concluded that his evidence did not demonstrate racial intent. The opinion reaffirms that Section 1981 “bars discrimination based on race or ethnicity—not religion.” Id. at 3.
For franchisors with faith-based models, the decision underscores the importance of clear and consistently applied ownership criteria. Christian Brothers’ success in obtaining summary judgment relied heavily on its documented, decades-long application of its Christian-only policy and its record of granting franchises to ethnically diverse Christians. Faith-oriented franchisors should ensure that such policies are articulated in franchise materials, grounded in sincerely held beliefs, and uniformly enforced to avoid any appearance of pretext.
At the same time, the ruling should not be viewed as carte blanche for religion-based exclusion. The opinion was narrowly tailored to the facts before the court, where the evidence demonstrated uniform application and no racial motive. A different factual record—one suggesting selective enforcement or mixed motives—could yield a different outcome.
Ultimately, Domanic v. Christian Brothers Automotive illustrates that faith-based franchising can coexist with federal civil rights law, provided that religious criteria are clearly defined, consistently applied, and genuinely tied to the brand’s identity rather than a proxy for race or ethnicity.
This article is based solely on the opinion of the Court in this matter. The author has not conducted any independent investigation into the facts. For the avoidance of doubt, each statement related to the law and facts in this article is drawn from the Court’s opinion in this case.
Thomas O’Connell is a Shareholder at Buchalter APC and Chair of the firm’s Franchise Practice Group. For questions about this article or media inquiries, you can contact Tom at toconnell@buchalter.com.
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