May 26, 2026|Franchise Frontlines
May 26, 2026 | United States District Court for the Central District of California | Slip Copy — Not Yet Reported (2026 WL 1508700)
Executive Summary
In a slip-copy order that is only available on Westlaw and not yet reported (2026 WL 1508700), Judge Hernán D. Vera of the United States District Court for the Central District of California granted defendant Michael Patrick Carroll’s motion for partial summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claims under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940. Plaintiffs Filberto Clemente and Jessie Davis, two executive-protection guards who worked on Carroll’s detail for approximately seven days in July 2024, were directly employed by third-party contractor Jaigur Kang through his security company, Royal Protection Group Inc. (“RPG”); they alleged that during the assignment Carroll suffered a mental-health episode in which he threatened them, held them at gunpoint, and used racial slurs. Because each FEHA claim was predicated on an employee-employer relationship, the threshold issue was whether Carroll — the client who received the security services — was the plaintiffs’ joint employer under California law. Carroll argued that Kang and RPG, not he, controlled the wages, hours, and working conditions of the work; the plaintiffs argued there was at least a triable dispute because Carroll directed where they went and what they did on site. The court concluded on this record that there was no genuine dispute of material fact, holding that the contractor exercised the day-to-day control that defines an employer and that Carroll’s on-site direction was, in the court’s words, “part-and-parcel of the job,” and it dismissed the FEHA claims (the Fifth through Eighth Causes of Action) with prejudice.
Relevant Background
Filberto Clemente and Jessie Davis provided “executive protection” for Michael Patrick Carroll for approximately seven days during July 2024. During that period the plaintiffs were directly employed by third-party contractor Jaigur Kang through his security company, Royal Protection Group Inc. (RPG). Both plaintiffs had prior military and security or law-enforcement experience. Kang was running a protective-services agency that contracted his employees out to clients; Carroll contracted directly with Kang but did not execute any agreement with the plaintiffs.
According to the opinion, Kang controlled the core terms of the plaintiffs’ work. He told them who they would protect and the hours and days they would work, paid them between $500 and $600 a night via Zelle, set their rates, had them log their hours through WhatsApp or text message, and required them to seek his approval for days off or breaks. Both plaintiffs worked part-time for Kang and held employment elsewhere during the same period. Kang stayed in regular contact through a group text chat and phone calls so the plaintiffs could keep him apprised of work situations and he could provide instructions, and the plaintiffs testified that Kang was their employer, direct supervisor, hiring official, and “chain of command.”
Carroll had hired full-time security from Kang through RPG after he experienced a mental-health episode in which he suffered from paranoia and believed he was being stalked and followed. Immediately before and after the alleged incident the plaintiffs informed Kang of Carroll’s behavior, and after the incident Kang told the plaintiffs to leave and, on July 31, 2024, texted them that the “contract [with Defendant] is terminated.” The plaintiffs sued Carroll in Los Angeles Superior Court on January 24, 2025, and Carroll removed the matter to federal court. The complaint asserted eight causes of action; the Fifth through Eighth alleged racial discrimination, hostile work environment, wrongful constructive discharge, and wrongful termination under FEHA, all of which the present motion addressed.
Decision
The court applied the familiar Rule 56(a) standard, noting that summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. To establish FEHA liability, the court explained, a plaintiff must show that the defendant is the plaintiff’s “employer.” Under California law, a party is an employer if it “employ[s] or exercise[s] control over the wages, hours, or working conditions of any person” (Cervantez v. Celestica Corp.), and courts assess employer status by looking to “the totality of the circumstances,” “placing emphasis on the control exercised by the employer over the employee’s performance of employment duties” (Bradley v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab.). The court catalogued the multi-factor test from Vernon v. State of California and emphasized that a finding of the right to control employment “requires … a comprehensive and immediate level of ‘day-to-day’ authority over employment decisions” (Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.).
Applying that standard, the court found that Carroll had proffered substantial evidence that RPG, through Kang, was the plaintiffs’ sole employer during the brief assignment. Kang, and not Carroll, hired the plaintiffs, paid them and set their rates, documented and assigned their hours and shifts, dictated their attire, monitored their real-time locations, and ultimately terminated the security-services contract. That “a non-party, rather than Defendant, completed all these actions,” the court held, “is strong evidence Defendant is not Plaintiff’s joint employer,” distinguishing cases such as Jimenez v. U.S. Continental Marketing, Inc., where a company that took a staffing-agency worker in house for years, supervised her, trained her, and imposed its own policies was found to be a joint employer.
The court then rejected the plaintiffs’ theory that Carroll’s on-site direction — dictating where they needed to be, where they went, and what personal tasks they performed — created a triable issue. Unlike a garment manufacturer’s total control over a worker’s stitch-by-stitch production or a ride-hailing company’s complete monitoring of a driver, the record here was “much different.” Over seven days Carroll sent the plaintiffs on personal tasks such as fetching coffee and demanded that they eat with him and accompany him, but he did not provide the tools to keep him safe or specific instructions on how to provide security; the record therefore did not show that he controlled the “day-to-day authority” over the central employment decisions involved in providing personal security. That the plaintiffs had to follow Carroll to his daily activities was, the court reasoned, “part-and-parcel of the job,” not evidence of control as a joint employer, and Carroll had done only “what [he] necessarily has a right to do-oversee (or ‘supervise’) the work of [his] contractors’ employees” (Thompson v. Oceanaire Homeowners Ass’n).
The court further distinguished the authorities on which the plaintiffs relied — including Mathieu v. Norrell Corp. and Paterson v. California Department of General Services — as cases where the putative joint employer retained authority over the worker’s daily work, provided sole supervision, trained the worker, or was contractually responsible for directing her. Here, by contrast, Kang consistently communicated with the plaintiffs throughout their shifts, terminated the contract, and offered them continued work at RPG. The court also noted that the plaintiffs worked for Carroll for only seven days, “an extremely short period unlikely to qualify Defendant as a joint employer.” Finding no triable issue on the joint-employer question, the court dismissed the FEHA-related claims with prejudice.
Looking Forward
Although this is an unreported district-court order applying California’s FEHA in the niche setting of executive-protection services, its control analysis may inform how courts approach joint-employer theories that migrate to branded and franchised systems. The decision draws a line that defense-side franchise counsel will recognize: a party can tell contractor personnel what the purchased service requires — even direct where and how a task unfolds on site — without assuming the functions that define an employer. On this record, the court treated the client’s field-level direction as “part-and-parcel of the job” rather than as day-to-day control over employment, and it credited the fact that a non-party performed the hiring, paying, scheduling, and firing. That control-versus-incidental-direction distinction is analogous, though not controlling, to the arguments franchisors raise when plaintiffs recast brand standards and operational guidance as evidence of joint employment.
For franchisors, branded operators, and employers, the cautionary and defensive lesson is to preserve a clean record showing that the direct employer — the franchisee, staffing agency, or contractor — controls the core employment levers the court emphasized here: hiring, setting and paying compensation, documenting and assigning hours, dictating attire, monitoring work, and terminating. The court gave weight to who “employ[s] or exercise[s] control over the wages, hours, or working conditions,” and to whether the putative employer held “a comprehensive and immediate level of ‘day-to-day’ authority over employment decisions.” A business that drifts into setting individual pay, approving hiring or firing, or controlling a contractor’s or franchisee’s schedules moves toward the functions courts scrutinize most closely, so brand-level direction is best tied to the service or standard being purchased rather than to the mechanics of employment.
The opinion is a persuasive, not binding, data point, and its facts are unusual — a short-term personal-security engagement rather than a multi-unit branded system — so its reach to franchise disputes should not be overstated. Still, its reasoning that on-site direction inherent in the service does not, by itself, establish joint-employer status, and that a short relationship weighs against employer status, offers franchisors and employers a useful framework for resisting joint-employer claims at summary judgment where the direct employer retains the employment relationship.
Thomas O’Connell is a Partner at Buchalter LLP and Chair of the firm’s Franchise Practice Group. For questions about this article or media inquiries, you can contact Tom at toconnell@buchalter.com.
This article is based solely on the opinion of the Court in this matter. The author has not conducted any independent investigation into the facts. For the avoidance of doubt, each statement related to the law and facts in this article is drawn from the Court’s opinion in this case. It was drafted with the assistance of an artificial intelligence system. AI systems can make mistakes, including in describing legal authority. Readers should independently confirm any legal authority before relying on it.
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