October 09, 2025|Franchise Frontlines
October 9, 2025 | U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida | Unpublished Opinion
Executive Summary
In an unpublished order, Magistrate Judge Julie S. Sneed of the Middle District of Florida granted in part and denied in part Daubert motions filed by Choice Hotels and related defendants seeking to exclude the opinions of the plaintiff’s hotel-security expert, Salvatore Caccavale, in a civil sex-trafficking case brought under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA). The plaintiff alleged she was trafficked at a franchised Orlando hotel in 2013. The court held that Mr. Caccavale was sufficiently qualified to testify on hotel security issues and that his methodology was generally reliable, but it excluded two specific components of his report: his opinion on the adequacy of the hotel’s training (Opinion 2) and his statement that hotel staff “knew” the plaintiff was being trafficked (part of Opinion 4). The remaining opinions survived. The ruling provides important insight into how courts evaluate expert testimony in hotel trafficking litigation and how franchisors may strategically challenge such evidence.
Relevant Background
According to the allegations, the plaintiff was trafficked for commercial sex between February and May 2013 at a hotel in Orlando, Florida that operated under Choice Hotels branding. The plaintiff claimed that traffickers used the hotel repeatedly and that various indicators of coercion and illicit activity were visible to hotel staff. She sued the franchisor defendants under § 1595 of the TVPRA, asserting that they knowingly benefited from, and participated in, a criminal venture through ongoing room rentals and allegedly inadequate anti-trafficking practices. The defendants deny these allegations and contend they did not operate or control the day-to-day activities of the hotel, which was managed by a separate franchisee entity.
To support her claims, the plaintiff offered expert testimony from Salvatore Caccavale, who has decades of experience in hotel safety and security. His report advanced four opinions. The first asserted that the alleged trafficking incident was foreseeable and that hotel ownership should have anticipated it based on crime patterns and conditions at the property. The second opined that inconsistent or insufficient staff training contributed to trafficking risks. The third claimed hotel ownership should have recognized the connection between drug activity and trafficking indicators at the property. The fourth asserted that failures by hotel management and staff exacerbated criminal activity and that it was “reasonable to conclude” that staff knew trafficking was occurring.
Mr. Caccavale based these opinions on a set of sources including calls-for-service data, a CrimeCast Basic Report showing area crime risk, law enforcement incident reports, online reviews collected by counsel, his own industry experience, and the four-part methodology endorsed by the International Association of Professional Security Consultants (IAPSC). He did not visit the hotel or conduct an on-site vulnerability assessment, and he acknowledged he did not know what training was in place during the relevant time period.
Choice Hotels and the franchisee defendants filed separate Daubert motions challenging nearly every aspect of his opinions. They argued he was not qualified to opine on human trafficking, that his methodology was unreliable, and that several opinions were impermissible legal conclusions. The plaintiff responded that the expert’s testimony was confined to hotel-security practices, that the IAPSC methodology has been repeatedly accepted by federal courts, and that any criticisms of his factual assumptions should be addressed through cross-examination rather than exclusion.
Decision
The court issued a detailed Daubert ruling, ultimately allowing some of Mr. Caccavale’s testimony while excluding portions that either lacked adequate foundation or crossed into the jury’s role.
The court first addressed qualifications. Although the defendants argued he could not testify about trafficking because he is not a trafficking expert, the court found that he was not being offered as such. Instead, the court concluded that his decades of experience in hotel security satisfied the relatively low threshold for expert qualification under Eleventh Circuit precedent, relying on decisions such as Skypoint Advisors v. 3 Amigos Productions and Tillman v. C.R. Bard, Inc. The court noted that an expert need not be a specialist in the precise subject matter at issue so long as the testimony remains within the reasonable bounds of the expert’s discipline. Because each of Mr. Caccavale’s opinions addressed hotel security and guest-safety practices, the court held that he was qualified to testify.
Turning to methodology, the court declined to exclude the expert on reliability grounds. The defendants contended that he did not follow the IAPSC methodology because he did not conduct an on-site assessment, relied on calls-for-service data that lacked context, and used CrimeCast data created years after the alleged trafficking. The court noted that federal courts have divided on the reliability of the IAPSC framework, citing decisions such as Hopkins v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., but emphasized that defendants did not challenge the methodology itself. Instead, they argued only that he failed to follow it perfectly. Because the IAPSC method has been peer-reviewed, widely applied, and accepted by others in the field, and because minor deviations are permissible given case-specific constraints, the court found the methodology sufficiently reliable for Daubert purposes. The court also emphasized that disputes about data quality typically go to weight, not admissibility, citing Eleventh Circuit cases like United States v. Ware and In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litigation.
With respect to Opinion 1, which addressed foreseeability, the defendants argued that the data underlying the opinion was insufficient to support the conclusion. The court acknowledged these concerns but held that they could be addressed through cross-examination, not exclusion. The opinion, the court found, could assist the jury in evaluating whether hotel staff or ownership should have recognized patterns of criminal activity relevant to the TVPRA knowledge standard discussed in Doe v. Red Roof Inns, Inc.
Opinion 2, which addressed the adequacy of staff training, was excluded. The court found that the expert admitted in his deposition that he did not know what training policies were in place at the time of the alleged trafficking. Relying on General Electric v. Joiner, the court held that an expert cannot offer an opinion supported only by ipse dixit rather than factual foundation. Without evidence of the hotel’s policies during 2013, the court ruled that the training opinion lacked a sufficient basis.
Regarding Opinion 3, which suggested that hotel staff should have recognized correlations between drug activity and trafficking, the defendants argued that the expert overreached because the plaintiff used only marijuana and alcohol and because drug activity does not necessarily signal trafficking. The court nonetheless allowed this opinion, finding that the expert’s reasoning fit within standard criminological analysis and that disagreements about his inferences go to weight. The court noted that he tied his opinion to area crime data and calls-for-service reports, making it at least minimally grounded in the record.
Opinion 4, however, was partially excluded. The court held that the expert could not testify that hotel staff “knew” the plaintiff was trafficked because this constituted an impermissible legal conclusion. The court cited its own prior reasoning in Doe E.M.B. v. G6 Hospitality and relied on Lorente-Garcia v. Giraldo-Navarro, explaining that while experts may opine about conditions or indicators, they may not tell the jury what mental state to attribute to the defendants. Because knowledge is an essential element of civil TVPRA liability, the court concluded that allowing an expert to opine directly on that issue would improperly invade the province of the jury.
Finally, the court rejected Choice Hotels’ argument that none of the expert’s opinions could apply to franchisors. The expert addressed hotel-security practices broadly rather than day-to-day supervision, and the court noted that questions about whether his opinions implicate franchisor conduct relate to weight rather than admissibility. The court therefore declined to exclude the remaining opinions solely on franchisor-role grounds.
Looking Forward
This ruling may help franchisors, brand systems, and multi-unit hotel operators better understand how courts are evaluating expert testimony in civil sex-trafficking cases. Although this decision arises from a specific property and factual record, the court’s analysis signals that hotel-security experts may be permitted to testify on foreseeability, area crime conditions, security practices, and observable red flags, provided the testimony is rooted in a recognized methodological framework and reflects the expert’s training and experience. At the same time, the ruling demonstrates that experts may not present conclusions that effectively decide core elements of TVPRA liability—such as whether a franchisor or franchisee had actual or constructive knowledge of trafficking.
For franchisors, this decision underscores the importance of differentiating between hotel security practices and the higher-level corporate functions identified in franchise agreements. Courts may permit experts to speak broadly about industry practices, but they will restrict testimony that attempts to characterize corporate actors’ mental states or assign culpability. Because TVPRA liability often turns on what the defendants allegedly knew or should have known, excluding expert testimony on that precise issue may become a critical litigation strategy.
This ruling also suggests that challenges to training-related expert opinions may succeed when the expert lacks historical knowledge of the hotel’s policies during the period of alleged trafficking. For franchisors, maintaining accurate archives of training materials and brand-standards manuals may improve their ability to rebut unsupported expert opinions. Finally, the court’s discussion of methodology indicates that general challenges to an expert’s application of a standardized framework may be less successful than targeted challenges focused on factual foundation and relevance. As always, outcomes will depend on jurisdiction, the expert’s specific testimony, and the underlying discovery record.
This article is based solely on the opinion of the Court in this matter. The author has not conducted any independent investigation into the facts. For the avoidance of doubt, each statement related to the law and facts in this article is drawn from the Court’s opinion in this case.
Thomas O’Connell is a Shareholder at Buchalter APC and Chair of the firm’s Franchise Practice Group. For questions about this article or media inquiries, you can contact Том at toconnell@buchalter.com.
This communication is not intended to create, and does not create, an attorney-client relationship or any other legal relationship. No statement herein constitutes legal advice, nor should it be relied upon or interpreted as such. This communication is for general informational purposes only and is not a substitute for legal counsel. Readers should not act or refrain from acting based on any information provided without seeking appropriate legal advice specific to their situation. For more information, visit www.buchalter.com.
