January 30, 2025|Franchise Frontlines
January 30, 2025 | Supreme Court of Nassau County, New York | Unpublished Opinion
Executive Summary
In an unpublished decision, Justice Conrad D. Singer of the Supreme Court of Nassau County addressed claims by a former charter school teacher against Seton Education Partners and its human resources director. The plaintiff alleged religious discrimination and failure to accommodate under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws (“NYSHRL” and “NYCHRL”). Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing Seton was not her employer and that the HR director could not be liable. The court concluded that the plaintiff alleged enough facts to plausibly support joint employer status under the “immediate control” test. At the same time, the court dismissed aiding-and-abetting claims, reiterating that “an individual cannot aid and abet his own alleged discriminatory conduct.” Krause v. Lancer & Loader Grp., LLC, 40 Misc. 3d 385, 398–99, 965 N.Y.S.2d 312, 322 (Sup. Ct. 2013).
Relevant Background
The plaintiff, Bat El Greenberg, was employed as an ICT math teacher at Brilla College Preparatory Charter Schools in the Bronx beginning in August 2022. She alleged that Seton Education Partners (“Seton”), a nonprofit organization affiliated with Brilla, was not simply a service provider but exercised immediate control over Brilla’s operations and her employment. According to her complaint, Seton staffed Brilla’s leadership team with its own employees, managed Brilla’s human resources functions, required her to complete mandatory trainings, and even had a Seton employee sign her offer letter.
Greenberg is an observant Jew. In September 2022, she informed Seton’s Senior Director of Human Resources and Risk Assessment, Kevin Hanratty, that she would need time off for Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur, and Simchas Torah. She alleged that during a heated discussion, Hanratty allowed some of the days but not all, warned her that “excessive absences” would lead to termination, and threatened her job security if she continued to take days off for religious observance. Greenberg nonetheless observed the holidays. Shortly after returning from Simchas Torah, she was terminated on October 18, 2022, with the stated reason being “verbal abuse and insubordination.” She alleged those reasons were pretextual.
Greenberg filed suit in 2024, alleging religious discrimination, retaliation, failure to accommodate, and aiding-and-abetting violations under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL. She claimed Seton was her joint employer and that Hanratty personally discriminated against her. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Brilla, not Seton, was her employer; that documentary evidence such as pay stubs and her offer letter confirmed Brilla’s role; and that any claim against Hanratty failed as a matter of law. They also argued for dismissal on statute of limitations grounds, claiming charter schools should be treated like school districts subject to a one-year bar.
Decision
The court first addressed whether the plaintiff had plausibly alleged Seton was her joint employer. Under New York law, “[t]he existence of an employer-employee relationship is a prerequisite for statutory claims of employment discrimination.” Hanley v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 722 F. Supp. 3d 112, 119 (E.D.N.Y. 2024). Applying the “immediate control” test, Justice Singer explained that “a joint employer relationship may be found to exist where there is sufficient evidence that the defendant had immediate control over the other company’s employees, and particularly the defendant’s control over the employee in setting the terms and conditions of the employee’s work.” Brankov v. Hazzard, 142 A.D.3d 445, 445–46, 36 N.Y.S.3d 133, 134–35 (1st Dep’t 2016).
The court noted that the plaintiff alleged every member of Brilla’s leadership team—including the co-founder, CFO, COO, chief talent officer, and chief of schools—were Seton employees, and that Hanratty, a Seton executive, directly managed her employment and termination. While defendants pointed to pay stubs showing Brilla as the employer and an offer letter stating her role was “with Brilla Preparatory Charter Schools,” the court found those documents did not “utterly refute” her allegations of Seton’s immediate control. Accordingly, her joint employer claim was allowed to proceed.
By contrast, the court dismissed aiding-and-abetting claims against both defendants. As to Hanratty, the court held that although individuals may face liability under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6), “an individual cannot aid and abet his own alleged discriminatory conduct.” Krause, 40 Misc. 3d at 398–99, 965 N.Y.S.2d at 322. Because the allegations described only his direct acts—denying accommodations, threatening termination, and discharging Greenberg—he could not simultaneously be treated as an aider or abettor. As to Seton, the court found Greenberg’s allegations of an “agency” relationship between Seton and Brilla too conclusory to sustain a separate aiding-and-abetting theory.
The court therefore allowed the plaintiff to amend her complaint to amplify allegations about Seton’s joint employer role and her religious accommodation claim, but dismissed retaliation and aiding-and-abetting claims with prejudice.
Looking Forward
This decision contributes to the developing body of joint employer case law in New York and provides another illustration of how courts may approach the “immediate control” test. Allegations that an affiliated entity manages HR functions, oversees leadership, or makes termination decisions may be enough—at least at the pleading stage—for claims to survive, even if payroll records or offer letters point to another entity. For franchisors and other organizations, this may be viewed as a reminder that operational involvement can draw scrutiny when plaintiffs advance joint employer theories.
The ruling also highlights the limits of individual liability under the NYSHRL. While executives or managers may face direct liability for discriminatory acts, they generally cannot be treated as aiders or abettors of the same conduct. As the court stated, “an individual cannot aid and abet his own alleged discriminatory conduct.” Krause, 40 Misc. 3d at 398–99, 965 N.Y.S.2d at 322. This line of reasoning may reduce certain risks for HR professionals, though the employing entity itself could still remain exposed if joint control is plausibly alleged.
Overall, Greenberg shows the fact-specific nature of joint employer analysis and the way courts continue to parse entity versus individual liability. The case may encourage franchisors, employers, and affiliates to consider how their HR and management structures are documented and presented, particularly when multiple entities are involved in employment decisions.
This article is based solely on the opinion of the Court in this matter. The author has not conducted any independent investigation into the facts. For the avoidance of doubt, each statement related to the law and facts in this article is drawn from the Court’s opinion in this case.
Thomas O’Connell is a Shareholder at Buchalter APC and Chair of the firm’s Franchise Practice Group. For questions about this article or media inquiries, you can contact Tom at toconnell@buchalter.com.
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