May 08, 2026|Franchise Frontlines
May 8, 2026 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | Published Opinion
Executive Summary
In a published decision, Judge Edith H. Jones of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed judgment on the pleadings for GStek, Inc., an Army contractor, in an ADA accommodation, disability-discrimination, and retaliation case brought by a former IT systems administrator. The plaintiff alleged that GStek failed to accommodate his autism, major depressive disorder, and social anxiety disorder by denying his request for full-time telework after pandemic-era remote work ended. GStek argued that in-person attendance was an essential function of the plaintiff’s position because the Army determined full-time telework was not in its interests, the Army retained authority over whether contractor employees could telework, and GStek had a business interest in honoring the Army’s requirements. The Fifth Circuit agreed, holding that the plaintiff was not a qualified individual under the ADA because he could not perform the essential in-person functions of his job, even though GStek had allowed him to work from home two to three days per week.
Relevant Background
Albert Hayes worked as an IT systems administrator at Fort Polk’s Army Network Enterprise Center. He initially worked through a contractor named GC&E. During the COVID-19 pandemic, he was temporarily permitted to telework. In 2021, the Army replaced GC&E with GStek. Hayes’s employment transferred to GStek, but his position as a contract systems administrator for the Army remained the same.
In February 2022, the Army and GStek transitioned away from telework and required Hayes to return to in-person work. Hayes alleged that the return to the office overstimulated him. In May 2022, he was diagnosed with autism, major depressive disorder, and social anxiety disorder. In August 2022, he was admitted to inpatient psychiatric care because of suicidal ideations.
In October 2022, Hayes submitted a physician’s note and requested full-time telework as a reasonable accommodation. GStek’s project manager initially believed Hayes could perform his work remotely, but the Army determined that full-time telework would not be in the best interest of the organization. Under GStek’s contract relationship with the Army, Army officials overseeing the contract in Hayes’s chain of command had to approve the requested accommodation. The Army also retained authority to control and set various terms and conditions for GStek employees working at Fort Polk, including whether they could telework.
GStek attempted a partial accommodation. It allowed Hayes to work from home two to three days per week from December 2022 to January 2023. On January 16, 2023, Hayes experienced what he described as a mental breakdown and worked from home until January 19. On January 19, he told GStek that his doctor recommended medical leave. On January 23, he told GStek he needed to work from home. The next day, he asked whether he needed to attend work but received no response. On January 25, GStek terminated his employment, citing absenteeism and other concerns raised by both GStek and Army officials.
Hayes pursued claims against both the Army and GStek. The district court dismissed the claims against the Army, and Hayes did not appeal that ruling. He also pursued administrative remedies against GStek, received a right-to-sue notice, and brought ADA claims for failure to accommodate, disability discrimination, and retaliation. GStek moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the claims with prejudice. Hayes appealed.
Decision
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court began with the failure-to-accommodate claim. To prevail, Hayes had to show that he was a qualified individual with a disability, that GStek knew of the disability and related limitations, and that GStek failed to make reasonable accommodations for those limitations. The dispute turned primarily on whether Hayes was qualified for the position with or without a reasonable accommodation.
The court emphasized that an employee is qualified only if he can perform the essential functions of the job despite the disability or if a reasonable accommodation would enable him to perform those functions. Courts give weight to the employer’s judgment when identifying essential job functions, and courts should not rely on the employee’s personal judgment about what functions are essential. Courts may also consider the amount of time spent performing the function, the experience of employees in similar jobs, and the consequences of not performing the function.
Applying those principles, the court held that in-person attendance was an essential function of Hayes’s job. The Army determined that full-time telework was not in its interests. Because GStek provided contract services to the Army, GStek had a business interest in honoring the Army’s conditions. Current GStek employees providing contract services to the Army did not receive full-time telework accommodations, and Hayes’s supervisor expressed concern that allowing full-time telework would open the floodgates to similar requests and potentially damage GStek’s contractual relationship with the Army.
The court also relied on the general principle that regular work-site attendance remains an essential function of most jobs. It rejected the argument that pandemic-era telework permanently changed that analysis. The Fifth Circuit quoted recent EEOC guidance recognizing that an employer’s temporary decision to excuse performance of one or more essential functions during COVID, or to permit telework during the pandemic, does not necessarily mean the employer permanently changed the job’s essential functions or that telework is always a feasible accommodation.
The court further considered supervision. An employer’s ability to supervise an employee is relevant to whether a work-from-home accommodation is reasonable. The court noted that direct supervision is easiest when the employee appears regularly at work and harder when the employee never comes to the office. Hayes acknowledged communication problems with his supervisor. Given those circumstances, the court held that full-time telework was not a reasonable accommodation.
The court also held that GStek satisfied its accommodation obligation by allowing Hayes to work from home two to three days per week. The ADA requires a reasonable accommodation, not the employee’s preferred accommodation. Because the requested full-time telework would have altered an essential function of the job, GStek did not have to grant it.
The disability-discrimination claim failed for the same essential-function reason. To establish a prima facie ADA discrimination claim without direct evidence, Hayes had to show that he had a disability, was qualified for the job, and suffered an adverse employment decision because of his disability. Because the court held that Hayes was not qualified to perform the job’s essential in-person functions, the discrimination claim could not proceed.
The retaliation claim also failed. Hayes argued that the timing between his accommodation request and his termination supported causation. The Fifth Circuit rejected that theory because approximately three months elapsed between the request and termination, and temporal proximity must be “very close” to establish causation. The court also held that Hayes’s inability to perform the essential functions of his job defeated causation. Because he could not perform the essential attendance function, his unsuccessful accommodation request could not supply the basis for a retaliation claim.
Looking Forward
This decision gives employers a useful post-COVID accommodation ruling, but it should be applied carefully. The Fifth Circuit did not hold that remote work can never be a reasonable accommodation. Instead, it held that full-time telework was not required for this specific Army-contractor position because in-person attendance remained essential, the Army retained authority over contractor telework, GStek had to honor the Army’s requirements, supervision mattered, and GStek had already offered partial telework.
The most important lesson is that temporary pandemic telework does not automatically rewrite essential job functions. Many employers allowed remote work during COVID to protect employees, comply with public-health conditions, or maintain operations during an emergency. Hayes recognizes that those temporary arrangements do not necessarily become permanent admissions that the employee can perform all essential functions remotely.
The decision is especially useful for employers that operate at customer sites, government facilities, secure environments, or locations where a client or contracting partner imposes operational requirements. GStek did not act in isolation. The Army determined that full-time telework was not in its interests and retained authority over contractor employees’ telework status. Employers in similar settings should document site requirements, customer requirements, security needs, supervision needs, and the consequences of not performing work in person.
For franchisors and franchise operators, the case has a narrower but practical analogy. Many franchise, restaurant, retail, fitness, hospitality, and service positions depend on in-person work, customer interaction, equipment access, team coordination, safety oversight, or location-specific operations. Employers should be prepared to explain why those functions are essential rather than assuming they are self-evident. The job description, actual work practices, scheduling structure, customer expectations, brand or operational requirements, and supervision needs may all matter.
The opinion also reinforces that employers do not have to provide an employee’s preferred accommodation if another reasonable accommodation allows the employee to perform the essential functions. GStek allowed Hayes to work from home two to three days per week. That partial accommodation did not create a duty to allow full-time telework. Employers should engage in the interactive process, consider alternatives, and document why a proposed accommodation is reasonable or why a requested accommodation would eliminate an essential function.
At the same time, employers should avoid overreading the decision. A court may reach a different result where the position has historically been performed remotely, where the employer lacks a concrete in-person requirement, where supervision can be performed effectively at a distance, where the employee can perform all essential functions remotely, or where the employer cannot articulate why physical attendance matters. The stronger the record connecting in-person attendance to job performance, safety, supervision, customer needs, contractual obligations, or business operations, the stronger the defense.
Hayes also provides a useful reminder for retaliation claims. Timing alone may not establish causation, particularly where several months pass between protected activity and termination. But employers should still be cautious when discipline or termination follows an accommodation request. The decision here rested on the plaintiff’s inability to perform essential functions and the absence of sufficiently close temporal proximity. Employers should continue to document legitimate reasons for the decision, separate accommodation review from discipline where appropriate, and ensure decision-makers can explain the nonretaliatory basis for the action.
For employers, the central takeaway is practical: define essential functions before a dispute arises, revisit job descriptions when operations change, document why physical presence matters, and treat temporary flexibility as temporary where that is the business reality. Remote work may be reasonable in some jobs, but Hayes confirms that the ADA does not require employers to eliminate essential in-person functions or disregard customer and site requirements to provide the employee’s preferred accommodation.
This article is based solely on the opinion of the Court in this matter. The author has not conducted any independent investigation into the facts. For the avoidance of doubt, each statement related to the law and facts in this article is drawn from the Court’s opinion in this case.
Thomas O’Connell is a Partner at Buchalter LLP and Chair of the firm’s Franchise Practice Group. For questions about this article or media inquiries, you can contact Tom at toconnell@buchalter.com.
This communication is not intended to create, and does not create, an attorney-client relationship or any other legal relationship. No statement herein constitutes legal advice, nor should it be relied upon or interpreted as such. This communication is for general informational purposes only and is not a substitute for legal counsel. Readers should not act or refrain from acting based on any information provided without seeking appropriate legal advice specific to their situation. For more information, visit www.buchalter.com.
