September 29, 2025|Franchise Frontlines
September 29, 2025 | Massachusetts Appeals Court | Published Opinion
Executive Summary
In a published decision, the Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed summary judgment in favor of UMass Memorial Health Care in a religious discrimination and joint employer case arising from a systemwide COVID-19 vaccination mandate. According to the opinion, the plaintiff, a surgical technician employed by a hospital subsidiary of the UMass Memorial system, alleged that she was denied a religious exemption based on her stated belief that her body was a temple of God and that she had prayed for guidance regarding vaccination. The Appeals Court held that a jury could reasonably find her beliefs religious in nature, that the record did not conclusively establish undue hardship, and that genuine factual disputes existed regarding whether UMass Memorial acted as her joint employer. The Court emphasized that inconsistencies between corporate affidavits, deposition testimony, and termination documents created triable issues of fact. The ruling does not establish liability but underscores the difficulty large systems may face when seeking summary judgment on employment-relationship questions where system-level documents or policies touch individual employment decisions.
Relevant Background
The opinion describes UMass Memorial as a broad healthcare system composed of multiple affiliated hospitals and facilities. One of those hospitals, UMass Memorial HealthAlliance-Clinton Hospital, employed the plaintiff as a certified surgical technician beginning in July 2021. Although the hospital served as the formal employer, UMass Memorial issued a systemwide COVID-19 vaccination policy that governed the conditions of employment across its affiliated entities. That policy required all employees to receive a first vaccine dose by early November 2021 and to be fully vaccinated by mid-December 2021. The policy included a process for medical and religious exemptions, reviewed by system-level committees, and outlined how human resources and managers would assess accommodations for employees whose exemptions were approved. The policy identified masking, enhanced eye protection, socially distanced meals, and frequent testing as examples of accommodations and provided that employees denied accommodation could seek reassignment within the system.
The plaintiff submitted a written request for a religious exemption in October 2021. As recounted by the Appeals Court, she stated that her body was a temple of God, that she had prayed for guidance about vaccination, and that she believed she received a message from God instructing her not to take it. She referenced Biblical passages and explained that her spiritual practice required her to pray before introducing substances into her body. The committee denied the request, stating that the plaintiff relied on “demonstrably false information” about the vaccines and concluding that such reliance could not serve as the basis for religious accommodation. The court noted that English was not the plaintiff’s primary language and that her request reflected that fact.
Two months later, a UMass Memorial vice president sent a letter informing her that she was being “separated from employment with UMass Memorial Health.” The record did not include any termination letter from the subsidiary hospital. The same vice president later submitted an affidavit asserting that UMass Memorial had no employees and did not hire, fire, discipline, or supervise hospital staff. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging that UMass Memorial denied a religious exemption in violation of state law and terminated her employment for failing to comply with the policy. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for UMass Memorial, concluding that her beliefs were not religious, that accommodating her would impose undue hardship, and that UMass Memorial was not her employer. The Appeals Court reversed.
Decision
The Court first addressed whether a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff’s stated beliefs were religious in nature. The opinion explains that Massachusetts law prohibits employers from imposing conditions of employment that require an employee to violate sincerely held religious beliefs. The Court emphasized that judges may not determine the validity or orthodoxy of religious doctrine. According to the opinion, the plaintiff stated that she believed her body was created in God’s image, that it functioned as a temple of God, and that she prayed about the vaccine and received guidance she believed to be divine. The Court noted that her description of prayer, spiritual discernment, and scriptural reference could allow a fact-finder to conclude that her beliefs were religious rather than secular. The Court also rejected the argument that inconsistencies in her deposition testimony eliminated factual disputes. It explained that when a plaintiff’s statements contain internal contradictions but no binding admission, a jury must weigh them.
The Court next considered whether the record conclusively established that no reasonable accommodation was possible without undue hardship. Because UMass Memorial rejected the plaintiff’s beliefs as non-religious, it did not conduct a full search for an accommodation. Under Massachusetts law, when such a search is absent, the employer must conclusively demonstrate that accommodating the employee would impose an undue hardship. The Appeals Court found no such showing. The system’s own policy contemplated religious accommodations, and the opinion noted that the plaintiff testified she had previously received influenza accommodations at other hospitals. According to the Appeals Court, UMass Memorial provided no affidavit from medical personnel explaining why the accommodations listed in its own policy could not be applied to a surgical technician or why reassignment to another role was not feasible. The system’s assertion that it needed to take all measures necessary to protect patients did not resolve the factual dispute because it already offered accommodations for other employees whose exemption requests were granted. In the absence of case-specific evidence, the Court held that a jury should decide whether accommodating this plaintiff would impose undue hardship.
The Appeals Court then turned to the joint employer question. The plaintiff conceded that the hospital subsidiary was her formal employer but argued that UMass Memorial acted as a joint employer because it set critical employment conditions, administered the exemption process, and issued her termination letter. Massachusetts applies a totality-of-the-circumstances framework that considers whether the alleged employer had the power to hire or fire the employee, supervised or controlled working conditions, determined the rate or method of payment, or maintained employment records. None of these factors is dispositive; courts consider all relevant circumstances.
The opinion states that the record contained evidence from which a jury could infer system-level involvement in key employment decisions. UMass Memorial issued the vaccination policy, administered the exemption review, described itself as the entity terminating her employment in the separation letter, and appeared to maintain system-level HR records. The vice president’s affidavit denying such involvement was contradicted by his deposition testimony and by the termination letter he signed. Because those inconsistencies created triable issues of fact, the Appeals Court held that summary judgment was inappropriate on the joint employer question. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
Looking Forward
This decision offers several insights for multi-entity organizations, including franchisors, that aim to maintain clear distinctions between parent entities and affiliated operating units. Although the case arises in healthcare, its reasoning reflects broader themes that frequently appear in joint employer litigation. The Appeals Court focused on perceived inconsistencies between corporate affidavits, deposition testimony, and the entity names appearing on employment documents. It explained that such inconsistencies can prevent a court from resolving employer-status issues on summary judgment, even when the parent entity asserts that it does not manage or supervise subsidiary employees. For organizations that maintain systemwide policies or HR protocols, the opinion illustrates how courts may scrutinize the specifics of policy administration, document authorship, and disciplinary communications when evaluating whether a factual dispute exists.
The Court also emphasized that the absence of role-specific evidence on accommodation and hardship can limit an employer’s ability to obtain judgment as a matter of law in religious-accommodation cases. When a policy already identifies acceptable accommodations, and when the record lacks evidence explaining why such accommodations would be infeasible for a particular role, a court may determine that the matter must proceed to trial. The Appeals Court cautioned against reliance on general assertions about reputational harm or institutional necessity, noting that a jury typically must resolve disputes concerning the feasibility of accommodations.
For franchisors and parent-level organizations, the opinion underscores the importance of ensuring that internal structures, HR functions, and communication protocols accurately reflect the intended allocation of responsibilities. A termination letter issued under the parent entity’s name, or policy documents that appear to emanate from the parent organization, can lead courts to conclude that factual questions exist regarding control. While the Court did not find that UMass Memorial was a joint employer, it held that the inconsistencies in the record required jury resolution. For multi-entity systems, this reinforces the value of consistent documentation, clear governance structures, and disciplined communication practices, particularly when decisions affecting individual employees flow through centralized processes. As joint employer theories continue to evolve across industries, organizations may benefit from assessing how their policies, forms, and HR procedures align with their intended separation of roles.
This article is based solely on the opinion of the Court in this matter. The author has not conducted any independent investigation into the facts. For the avoidance of doubt, each statement related to the law and facts in this article is drawn from the Court’s opinion in this case.
Thomas O’Connell is a Shareholder at Buchalter APC and Chair of the firm’s Franchise Practice Group. For questions about this article or media inquiries, you can contact Tom at toconnell@buchalter.com.
This communication is not intended to create, and does not create, an attorney-client relationship or any other legal relationship. No statement herein constitutes legal advice, nor should it be relied upon or interpreted as such. This communication is for general informational purposes only and is not a substitute for legal counsel. Readers should not act or refrain from acting based on any information provided without seeking appropriate legal advice specific to their situation. For more information, visit www.buchalter.com.
