September 30, 2025|Franchise Frontlines
September 30, 2025 | U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio | Unpublished Opinion
Executive Summary
In an unpublished decision, Judge Algenon L. Marbley of the Southern District of Ohio denied motions to dismiss filed by Choice Hotels International, Inc. and Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc. in a civil trafficking case brought under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) and the Child Abuse Victims’ Rights Act (CAVRA). The plaintiff alleged she was trafficked as a minor at a Choice-branded Rodeway Inn and a Wyndham-branded Super 8 in Fresno, California. The franchisors challenged personal jurisdiction, the sufficiency of the TVPRA allegations, the statute of limitations, and the viability of agency and joint-employer theories. Judge Marbley concluded that the plaintiff adequately alleged minority, direct perpetrator liability, beneficiary liability, and constructive knowledge, and that she plausibly alleged both agency and joint-employer vicarious liability. The court found CAVRA’s jurisdictional language sufficient to establish nationwide personal jurisdiction and held that none of the franchisors’ legal arguments warranted dismissal at this stage.
Relevant Background
According to the allegations in the complaint, the plaintiff was kidnapped by her trafficker at approximately fifteen years old after running away from home. She alleged that between October 2012 and May 2013, she was trafficked for commercial sex at two low-cost motel properties in Fresno, California: a Rodeway Inn branded under Choice Hotels and a Super 8 branded under Wyndham Hotels & Resorts. She alleged that she stayed for weeks or months at a time in the Rodeway Inn and for shorter periods at the Super 8. She asserted that she was repeatedly beaten, coerced, and threatened while confined in the rooms, and that loud altercations and physical assaults were audible from common areas. She further alleged that her trafficker regularly paid for rooms in cash, sometimes paying extra to avoid police intervention, and that the rooms exhibited numerous indicators of trafficking activity.
The complaint alleged many of the familiar “red flags” courts have considered in other cases, including constant foot traffic, multiple older men visiting the room, a large number of used condoms in trash cans, daily in-and-out transactions with the front desk, housekeeping disruptions, avoidance of staff contact, and requests for privacy. The plaintiff asserted that she looked visibly young, appeared injured and malnourished, and showed obvious signs of trauma when interacting with staff. She alleged that at one point she was robbed outside the Rodeway Inn and asked the front desk for help, including access to security footage, but was refused assistance.
The plaintiff alleged that both franchisors financially benefitted from the room rentals and failed to implement adequate anti-trafficking policies or oversight mechanisms. She also alleged that both franchisors exercised significant operational and brand-standards control over their franchisees through reservation systems, rate-setting structures, inspections, property-management systems, data analytics, and the approval of local vendors such as Wi-Fi and security providers. The plaintiff argued these structures supported both agency and joint-employer theories.
Choice and Wyndham filed motions to dismiss arguing, among other things, that the plaintiff failed to allege that she was a minor, failed to state perpetrator or beneficiary liability, failed to establish personal jurisdiction in Ohio, failed to plead timely claims, and failed to allege any actionable control or knowledge. They also argued that any misconduct, if proven, would be attributable to independent franchisees and not to the franchisors.
The plaintiff opposed the motions, relying heavily on earlier decisions from the Southern District of Ohio—including M.A., H.H., G.M., and T.D.P.—in which Judge Marbley and other judges had previously allowed similar claims to proceed against hotel franchisors. The plaintiff argued that those cases involved similar allegations of coercive trafficking, similar red-flag indicators, and nearly identical types of operational control alleged against Wyndham and Choice. The court ultimately agreed with the plaintiff on every point relevant to dismissal.
Decision
Judge Marbley denied the franchisors’ motions to dismiss in full. The decision is extensive, and its reasoning is significant for franchisors because it relies on a decade of TVPRA case law that interprets key statutory elements broadly and because it situates the allegations within a well-established line of cases in this district and the Seventh Circuit.
The court began with personal jurisdiction. Relying heavily on its prior decision in T.D.P. v. Choice Hotels International, Inc. and guided by the statutory text, Judge Marbley found that CAVRA authorizes nationwide personal jurisdiction when a plaintiff alleges she was trafficked as a minor in violation of § 1591. He held that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged minority—citing allegations that she was kidnapped at age fifteen, trafficked between ages fifteen and sixteen, and abused at the Rodeway Inn and Super 8 during that time. Because CAVRA allows suit in “any appropriate United States District Court,” the court concluded it had jurisdiction without regard to Wyndham’s or Choice’s location or the California location of the alleged events. The court explicitly rejected the franchisors’ argument that CAVRA requires the defendant itself to be a direct violator of § 1591. Drawing on his reasoning in T.D.P., Judge Marbley emphasized that § 2255 does not specify whom a victim may sue and may include beneficiaries and participants in a violation, provided the plaintiff satisfies the traditional requirements of standing.
The court next rejected the statute-of-limitations arguments. Again relying on the allegations of minority, the court held that the plaintiff was not constrained by the “ten years after the cause of action arose” provision in § 1595(c), because trafficking involving minors carries a longer period—ten years after the victim reaches age eighteen. Since the plaintiff reached adulthood after 2013, a suit filed in 2024 was timely. The court noted that Choice raised no additional timeliness argument beyond the minority allegation.
Turning to the core of the claim—civil liability under § 1595—the court began by restating the principle from M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc. that a civil trafficking claim does not require the defendant to have committed the underlying criminal act. Drawing on H.H., S.J., and Ricchio, the court reaffirmed that § 1595 can be a standalone civil cause of action.
On perpetrator liability under § 1591(a)(1), the court concluded that the complaint plausibly alleged that the franchisor defendants knowingly harbored or maintained the plaintiff by continuing to rent rooms to the traffickers in circumstances that allegedly made ongoing coercion evident. The court noted that the plaintiff alleged staff received payments to avoid calling police, placed the plaintiff in secluded rooms, and interacted with her while she appeared physically deteriorated. Relying on Doe v. Best Western International, the court found that the plaintiff was entitled to the inference that the franchisors knew, or at least recklessly disregarded, the coercive nature of the trafficker’s conduct based on the alleged circumstances.
For beneficiary liability under § 1595(a), the court identified three elements: knowing benefit, participation in a venture, and constructive or actual knowledge of trafficking. Relying on M.A. and H.H., the court held that rental revenue meets the “knowing benefit” element. On the “participation in a venture” element, the court relied on G.G. v. Salesforce.com, Inc. and its own earlier decisions to conclude that the venture need not be a sex-trafficking venture. A commercial business relationship—such as the franchisor–franchisee structure—can satisfy the venture prong. The court found the plaintiff’s allegations about ongoing room rentals, brand-standards control, property-management systems, inspections, and failure to implement anti-trafficking policies sufficient to plausibly allege participation in a commercial venture with franchisees that allegedly interacted with traffickers. Judge Marbley explicitly distinguished the Eleventh Circuit’s Doe #1 decision, noting that its narrower reasoning turned on how the plaintiffs defined the venture in that case.
The court also held the plaintiff plausibly alleged constructive knowledge. Relying on its own decisions in M.A., G.M., and T.D.P., the court stated that allegations of widespread red flags, combined with alleged industrywide awareness of trafficking and alleged failures to adequately train staff, may satisfy the “should have known” negligence standard of § 1595(a). Drawing on Ricchio and distinguishing Lawson v. Rubin, the court concluded that the alleged facts fell somewhere between those two cases, making survival at the pleading stage appropriate.
The court then evaluated agency and joint-employer theories. For agency, the court relied on the Restatement (Third) of Agency and prior franchisor cases such as Bricker v. R&A Pizza and G.M. v. Choice Hotels International. It held that allegations of franchisor operational control—including reservation systems, required vendors, inspections, data collection, centralized training, and rate controls—were sufficient to plausibly allege an agency relationship, even though the existence of a franchise agreement alone is not enough.
For joint-employer liability, the court relied on its earlier decision in A.M. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, as well as B.D.G. v. Choice Hotels International and Sixth Circuit joint-employer precedent. It concluded that allegations of franchisor influence over hiring, training, advancement, pay structures, and employment-related policies were sufficient at the pleading stage. The court emphasized that joint-employer analysis is a fact-intensive inquiry inappropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss.
Finally, the court rejected the franchisors’ argument that joint and several liability should be precluded. Relying on Doe v. Best Western International, the court held that the question was premature because no defendant had yet been found liable.
Looking Forward
This decision may offer franchisors, hotel systems, and multi-brand operators guidance on how courts evaluate TVPRA claims at the pleading stage, particularly in jurisdictions that apply broad interpretations of § 1595. The ruling reflects a trend toward allowing trafficking claims to proceed when plaintiffs allege constructive knowledge, operational involvement, financial benefit, and brand-standards control, even if franchisors dispute whether they exercised meaningful day-to-day control. The court’s analysis also shows how allegations about property-level indicators and alleged industrywide awareness may influence constructive-knowledge determinations.
For franchisors, the decision underscores the importance of understanding both the direct-liability and vicarious-liability pathways that plaintiffs may pursue under the TVPRA. Agency and joint-employer theories may be invoked based on allegations about reservation platforms, brand-standards enforcement, training programs, required vendors, inspection protocols, job postings, and data-collection systems. While these allegations may later be rebutted through evidence about actual operational responsibility, the decision highlights that courts may defer those factual questions until summary judgment or trial.
The ruling also suggests that CAVRA’s jurisdictional provisions may allow plaintiffs to sue national brands in federal courts far from the alleged trafficking locations, creating additional litigation-risk considerations for franchisors with nationwide portfolios. Although jurisdictions differ in their interpretations of the TVPRA and CAVRA, and outcomes will depend heavily on the factual record developed in discovery, this decision reflects how one federal court approached allegations of operational control, constructive knowledge, and alleged financial benefit from room rentals at the pleading stage.
As always, this decision reflects only the court’s analysis at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Liability is not determined until evidence is presented, and franchisors may prevail at later stages once the record is fully developed. Nonetheless, the opinion provides a detailed and instructive example of how courts may evaluate TVPRA claims in cases alleging trafficking at franchised hotels.
This article is based solely on the opinion of the Court in this matter. The author has not conducted any independent investigation into the facts. For the avoidance of doubt, each statement related to the law and facts in this article is drawn from the Court’s opinion in this case.
Thomas O’Connell is a Shareholder at Buchalter APC and Chair of the firm’s Franchise Practice Group. For questions about this article or media inquiries, you can contact Tom at toconnell@buchalter.com.
This communication is not intended to create, and does not create, an attorney-client relationship or any other legal relationship. No statement herein constitutes legal advice, nor should it be relied upon or interpreted as such. This communication is for general informational purposes only and is not a substitute for legal counsel. Readers should not act or refrain from acting based on any information provided without seeking appropriate legal advice specific to their situation. For more information, visit www.buchalter.com.
