May 29, 2026|Franchise Frontlines
May 29, 2026 | United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Unpublished Opinion
Executive Summary
In an unpublished per curiam decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Fulton County Government in an employment case brought by a former Fulton County Juvenile Court intake specialist. Plaintiff Rose Pope asserted ADA, ADEA, and FMLA claims, arguing that Fulton County acted as her employer or joint employer because she was paid from County funds, worked in a County building, used a County key card, and complied with County policies. Fulton County argued that the Juvenile Court, not the County, controlled the terms and conditions of Pope’s employment. The Eleventh Circuit agreed, holding that Georgia law vested personnel authority in the Chief Judge of the Juvenile Court, including authority over appointment, salary, tenure, compensation, conditions of employment, and removal for cause. Because Fulton County provided only paymaster, administrative, and budgetary functions, the court held that it was not Pope’s joint employer.
Relevant Background
Pope worked as an intake specialist for the Fulton County Juvenile Court’s intake unit from 2015 to 2022. Her duties included answering calls from police stations with juveniles in custody, entering juveniles’ information into the court’s electronic records system, and determining whether juveniles could be detained. Like other intake specialists, Pope was paid from Fulton County’s funds, worked in a Fulton County building, used a Fulton County key card to access the building, and was expected to comply with the Fulton County Standards of Conduct Policy and Procedure.
During her employment, Pope experienced health issues. In 2021, she was diagnosed with degenerative arthritis in her left knee and received FMLA leave for knee replacement surgery. She returned to work three months later and requested disability accommodations, which were denied. In 2022, she was diagnosed with degenerative arthritis in her right knee and was approved for FMLA leave from August 2022 to October 2022.
The opinion also describes performance and conduct concerns. Beginning at least in March 2021, coworkers complained that Pope passed work to other intake specialists, and police officers reported poor customer service. Pope also allegedly yelled at or insulted other intake specialists. After she received a written warning, her supervisors recommended termination. The supervisors did not check whether Pope would be out on FMLA leave before submitting their recommendation to the Chief Judge of the Juvenile Court, who served as the final decisionmaker. On July 26, 2022, Pope received a termination letter stating that she violated the Fulton County Standards of Conduct Policy and Procedure by failing to perform job responsibilities and using offensive or objectionable words or actions. The letter appeared on Juvenile Court letterhead and listed court managers, including the Chief Judge.
Pope sued Fulton County, the Fulton County Board of Commissioners, and the Juvenile Court, asserting claims under Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, and the FMLA. She later amended her complaint, removed the Title VII claim and the Board of Commissioners, and ultimately proceeded only against Fulton County. Fulton County moved for summary judgment, arguing that it could not be liable under the ADA, ADEA, or FMLA because it was not Pope’s employer. The district court agreed, and Pope appealed.
Decision
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court construed Pope’s pro se appellate arguments liberally and focused on the only employment-status theory preserved for appeal: whether Fulton County acted as a joint employer with the Juvenile Court. The court did not address a single-employer theory because Pope had conceded in the district court that she was not asserting that theory.
The court explained that, under the joint-employer test, two entities may be considered joint employers when they contract with each other for the performance of a task and one entity retains sufficient control over the terms and conditions of employment of the other entity’s employees. In applying that test to governmental subdivisions, the court emphasized that courts must remain mindful of the state’s decision to divide and separate governmental agencies and subdivisions.
Georgia law controlled the analysis. The Georgia Constitution establishes the Juvenile Court as a separate governmental entity vested with the judicial power of the state. Georgia law allows Juvenile Court employees to be paid from County funds, but gives the Chief Judge of the Juvenile Court authority to appoint clerks and other necessary personnel and determine their salary, tenure, compensation, and conditions of employment. Georgia law also gives the Chief Judge authority to remove Juvenile Court employees for cause. The Eleventh Circuit found that this is what happened in Pope’s case.
The court held that the Chief Judge filled nearly all of the roles traditionally filled by an employer. The Georgia Constitution also prohibited Fulton County from taking action affecting the courts or their personnel. Based on that structure, the court held that Fulton County and the Juvenile Court were not joint employers, and that Fulton County could not be held liable for the alleged misconduct.
Pope pointed to payroll records, the EEOC charge, an unemployment appeal decision, and FMLA documentation to show that Fulton County employed her. The court declined to consider several of those materials because they were not part of the district-court record. As to the EEOC charge, the court found it insufficient even when read in Pope’s favor. The Fulton County Board of Commissioners and the Juvenile Court were not the same as the Fulton County entity sued in the operative complaint, and both had been removed as defendants. The record and Georgia law established that Fulton County was not Pope’s employer, even though it provided paymaster, administrative, and budgetary functions for the Juvenile Court.
The Eleventh Circuit therefore held that Pope failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact on whether Fulton County controlled the essential terms and conditions of her employment. It affirmed summary judgment dismissing her discrimination claims.
Looking Forward
This decision reinforces a practical point for employers and franchisors facing joint-employer theories: administrative infrastructure does not equal employment control. Fulton County paid Pope from County funds, provided the building where she worked, issued the access card she used, and supplied conduct policies. Those facts did not make the County her employer because Georgia law and the actual employment structure placed appointment, compensation, employment conditions, and removal authority with the Juvenile Court’s Chief Judge.
For franchisors, the analogy is useful but should be applied carefully. This case involved governmental entities and turned heavily on Georgia constitutional and statutory law. It does not decide how private franchise systems should be analyzed. Still, the reasoning supports a broader defense principle: courts should examine who actually controls the essential terms and conditions of employment, not merely who provides administrative support, physical infrastructure, forms, policies, or background systems.
That distinction matters in franchise and multi-entity settings. Plaintiffs may point to shared platforms, system standards, required policies, brand facilities, reporting systems, training materials, or administrative services as evidence of joint employment. Pope illustrates why those facts should not end the analysis. The question remains whether the putative joint employer controls hiring, firing, discipline, compensation, scheduling, leave decisions, accommodations, or other core employment terms.
The opinion also complements recent decisions rejecting efforts to aggregate related entities based on general overlap. In many systems, one entity may provide payroll support, benefits administration, technology, facilities, or policy templates, while another entity retains actual authority over employment decisions. Preserving that separation in documents and practice can be important. The clearer the record shows that the direct employer makes personnel decisions, the stronger the defense against joint-employer claims.
Employers should not overread the decision. Payroll, facilities, and policies may matter in some cases, especially where they combine with evidence of direct supervision or decision-making authority. But Pope is a helpful reminder that those administrative facts are not enough by themselves. A plaintiff still must show that the defendant controlled the terms and conditions of employment in a meaningful way.
For franchisors, the best takeaway is disciplined separation. Franchise agreements, manuals, operations support, and field guidance should preserve the franchisee’s authority over its own employees. Franchisors can protect the brand without assuming control over employment decisions. Pope reinforces that courts may respect those lines when the legal structure and factual record show that the challenged employment decisions belonged to someone else.
This article is based solely on the opinion of the Court in this matter. The author has not conducted any independent investigation into the facts. For the avoidance of doubt, each statement related to the law and facts in this article is drawn from the Court’s opinion in this case.
Thomas O’Connell is a Partner at Buchalter LLP and Chair of the firm’s Franchise Practice Group. For questions about this article or media inquiries, you can contact Tom at toconnell@buchalter.com.
This communication is not intended to create, and does not create, an attorney-client relationship or any other legal relationship. No statement herein constitutes legal advice, nor should it be relied upon or interpreted as such. This communication is for general informational purposes only and is not a substitute for legal counsel. Readers should not act or refrain from acting based on any information provided without seeking appropriate legal advice specific to their situation. For more information, visit www.buchalter.com.
