December 11, 2025|Franchise Frontlines
December 11, 2025 | Superior Court of Pennsylvania | Non-Precedential Decision
Executive Summary
In Ripka v. Gramm, 2025 WL 3553130 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 11, 2025), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed dismissal of a personal injury action where the plaintiff filed a writ of summons shortly before the statute of limitations expired but failed to make any effort to effect service for nearly seven months. The plaintiff argued that the defendants waived their challenge under Lamp v. Heyman, 366 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1976), by raising it in new matter rather than by preliminary objection. The majority rejected that waiver argument, relying heavily on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ferraro v. Patterson-Erie Corp., 313 A.3d 987 (Pa. 2024), and held that the action was time-barred because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a good-faith effort to effectuate service. A dissent would have found waiver under Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 1028 and 1032. The decision reinforces that strict compliance with service rules remains essential to tolling the statute of limitations in Pennsylvania.
Relevant Background
The plaintiff alleged that he was injured in a December 29, 2020 motorbike accident involving a vehicle owned by Fisher Auto Parts, Inc. He initiated the action by filing a writ of summons on December 6, 2022—approximately twenty-three days before the statute of limitations expired.
He made no effort to serve the writ during the ensuing thirty days. Nor did he attempt service during the following six months. In July 2023—after the statute of limitations had expired—the plaintiff reissued the writ and promptly served the defendants. He later filed a complaint.
In their answer and new matter, the defendants asserted that the action was barred under Lamp and its progeny because the plaintiff failed to make a good-faith effort to effectuate service before the statute expired. The plaintiff replied to the new matter but did not file preliminary objections challenging the procedural vehicle used to raise the Lamp defense.
The defendants later moved for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that the plaintiff’s failure to attempt service for seven months constituted precisely the type of conduct Lamp sought to prevent. The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
Decision
The Superior Court affirmed.
The court began by reiterating the framework governing service and tolling in Pennsylvania. Filing a writ of summons can toll the statute of limitations, but only if the plaintiff refrains from conduct that stalls the legal machinery set in motion. See Lamp v. Heyman, 366 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1976). Subsequent decisions—including McCreesh v. City of Philadelphia, 888 A.2d 664 (Pa. 2005), and most recently Ferraro v. Patterson-Erie Corp., 313 A.3d 987 (Pa. 2024)—require a plaintiff to demonstrate a good-faith effort to diligently and timely serve process.
The plaintiff made no attempt to comply with Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 400(a), which requires original process to be served by the sheriff within thirty days. Instead, he waited nearly seven months before reissuing the writ—well after the limitations period expired.
The Superior Court emphasized that actual notice is not a substitute for proper service. Quoting Ferraro, the court reiterated that notice to a defendant only enters the good-faith analysis if it results from an attempt to comply with the Rules. Informal or unrelated notice does not salvage a failure to pursue proper service. The plaintiff’s explanation that the failure to serve was merely an oversight did not satisfy the evidentiary burden required under Lamp.
The more nuanced portion of the opinion addressed waiver. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Ferraro clarified that a Lamp challenge is a challenge to service—not a statute-of-limitations defense—and therefore should be raised by preliminary objection under Rule 1028. Here, the defendants raised the issue in new matter instead.
The plaintiff argued that the failure to file preliminary objections resulted in waiver under Rule 1032. The majority rejected that argument, distinguishing Cinque v. Asare, 585 A.2d 490 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), where defendants had actively litigated the merits before raising service defects. In contrast, the defendants in Ripka raised their Lamp objection in their initial responsive pleading and did not engage in merits litigation before doing so.
Relying on Ferraro and a subsequent Superior Court decision, Galeone v. Rodeway Inn Ctr. City, 2021 WL 3126754 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 23, 2021) (non-precedential), the court concluded that waiver was not appropriate where the service objection was raised in the defendant’s first response and the relevant facts were undisputed. The court noted that neither party strictly complied with the Rules—the defendants did not file preliminary objections, and the plaintiff did not file preliminary objections to the new matter challenging that procedural misstep.
The dissent would have found waiver mandatory under Rules 1028 and 1032, reasoning that Rule 126’s liberal-construction doctrine does not excuse complete noncompliance and that excusing the error prejudiced the plaintiff by resulting in dismissal. The majority, however, focused on the absence of prejudice and the fundamental importance of proper service in conferring personal jurisdiction.
Ultimately, because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a good-faith effort to effectuate service before the statute expired, the writ did not toll the statute of limitations. The action was therefore time-barred.
Looking Forward
Although this case arises from a motor vehicle accident, its implications extend well beyond personal injury litigation. For franchisors and multi-unit operators conducting business in Pennsylvania, the decision reinforces several important principles.
First, strict compliance with service rules remains essential to tolling the statute of limitations. Filing a placeholder writ shortly before expiration will not preserve claims if the plaintiff fails to pursue timely service. Courts will require affirmative, documented good-faith efforts.
Second, actual notice is not a substitute for service. Informal awareness of litigation does not cure failure to comply with Rule 400 or revive a “dead” writ after the limitations period has expired.
Third, Ripka clarifies that not every procedural misstep in raising a Lamp defense results in waiver. Where a defendant raises the service challenge in its initial response and does not engage in merits litigation before doing so, courts may reach the merits notwithstanding imperfect compliance with Rule 1028.
Finally, the case underscores that personal jurisdiction and service of process are foundational issues. Pennsylvania appellate courts continue to treat compliance with service rules as a substantive safeguard rather than a technicality.
For franchisors and other system operators who frequently face late-served writs or complaints filed near the statute deadline, Ripka confirms that early and carefully preserved Lamp challenges remain a meaningful defense tool. At the same time, the decision highlights the importance of raising service objections promptly and strategically to avoid waiver disputes.
This article is based solely on the opinion of the Court in this matter. The author has not conducted any independent investigation into the facts. For the avoidance of doubt, each statement related to the law and facts in this article is drawn from the Court’s opinion in this case.
Thomas O’Connell is a Shareholder at Buchalter LLP and Chair of the firm’s Franchise Practice Group. For questions about this article or media inquiries, you can contact Tom at toconnell@buchalter.com.
This communication is not intended to create, and does not create, an attorney-client relationship or any other legal relationship. No statement herein constitutes legal advice, nor should it be relied upon or interpreted as such. This communication is for general informational purposes only and is not a substitute for legal counsel. Readers should not act or refrain from acting based on any information provided without seeking appropriate legal advice specific to their situation. For more information, visit www.buchalter.com.
