June 27, 2025|Franchise Frontlines
June 27, 2025 | U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada | Published Decision
Executive Summary
In Sarah C. v. Hilton Franchise Holding LLC, 2025 WL 1797706 (D. Nev. June 27, 2025), a magistrate judge issued a detailed ruling on competing protective-order motions in a Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) case involving a franchised Hampton Inn. The plaintiff, proceeding pseudonymously, alleged that individual traffickers coerced her into commercial sex at the hotel when she was 16 and 17. She sued the franchisor, Hilton Franchise Holding LLC, as well as the former and current hotel owners, asserting federal TVPRA claims, state human-trafficking claims, and negligence. The court allowed the plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym through the summary-judgment phase and required defendants to give her thirty days’ notice before revealing her identity to alleged traffickers or affiliates. However, the court refused to require notice before defendants contacted traffickers for discovery purposes, citing legitimate work-product concerns. It also denied requests to restrict disclosure of an alleged trafficker’s identity and denied “Attorney’s Eyes Only” treatment for the plaintiff’s settlement agreement with that individual. The opinion provides important guidance for hotel franchisors responding to human-trafficking litigation, particularly with respect to protective-order strategy, work-product rights, and balancing discovery needs with victim safety.
Relevant Background
According to the allegations, the plaintiff used the pseudonym “Sarah C.” and alleged that between mid-2019 and late-2020, four individuals coerced her into engaging in commercial sex acts with customers at a Hampton Inn location in Nevada. She alleged more than 150 encounters occurred, two-thirds of which were allegedly with one individual, “Mohammad A.” The plaintiff did not sue Mohammad A.; instead, she settled with him privately. She sued Hilton Franchise Holding LLC (the Hampton Inn franchisor) as well as N.W.H. Ltd. and SSJV Hospitality LLC (the former and current hotel owners), along with the four alleged traffickers. She asserted claims under the TVPRA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1595 et seq., the federal Child Abuse Victims Rights Act, Nevada state trafficking statutes, and common-law negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The plaintiff moved for a protective order to accomplish four things: (1) proceed under a pseudonym; (2) require defendants to give thirty days’ notice before “contacting or revealing her true identity” to her alleged traffickers or affiliates; (3) allow her to disclose her settlement agreement with Mohammad A. under an Attorney’s Eyes Only (AEO) provision; and (4) restrict disclosure of Mohammad A.’s identity. The franchisor and hotel owners opposed the latter three categories. Mohammad A. intervened to support the plaintiff’s AEO and identity-protection requests. The individual defendants did not appear.
The magistrate judge evaluated the protective-order requests under Rule 26(c), which authorizes courts to enter protective orders upon a showing of “good cause” to prevent “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). The court also relied extensively on prior protective-order rulings in TVPRA cases involving hotel franchisors, including J.C. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, V.G. v. G6 Hospitality, and M.L. v. Craigslist.
Decision
The court first addressed pseudonymity. Because both the plaintiff and the hotel franchisor agreed she could proceed pseudonymously at least through discovery, the court granted that portion of the motion. It explained that the Ninth Circuit requires balancing “the severity of the threatened harm,” “the reasonableness of the anonymous party’s fears,” and “the anonymous party’s vulnerability.” Sarah C., 2025 WL 1797706, at *2 (citing Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000)). The court concluded that anonymity was appropriate but limited it to the “pre-summary judgment phase,” noting that after dispositive motions the plaintiff would need to renew her request. Id.
The court next examined whether defendants must provide advance notice before contacting or revealing the plaintiff’s identity to alleged traffickers or affiliates. The plaintiff’s proposed order would have required thirty-days’ advance notice before any contact. But her brief requested only notice before revealing her identity. The court viewed this discrepancy as significant, noting the plaintiff “does not explain why her proposed ‘contact’ notice is necessary.” Id. at *3. Defendants argued that requiring pre-contact notice would reveal defense strategy and violate work-product protections. The court agreed, noting federal courts in other TVPRA cases had rejected similar overbroad contact-notice requirements.
The court contrasted the plaintiff’s request with the narrower approach in M.L. v. Craigslist, where defendants were not required to give notice before contacting traffickers but were required to give notice before revealing the plaintiff’s identity. The court explained: “M.L. persuasively stands for the proposition that protective-order language that does not require a defendant to reveal each time they contact the alleged traffickers, just when they reveal the plaintiff’s identity, balances the plaintiff’s safety concerns with the defendant’s work-product concerns.” Id. at *4. Citing J.C. v. Choice Hotels and V.G. v. G6 Hospitality, the court concluded the plaintiff had “not shown good cause” for contact-notice provisions. Id. It therefore required defendants to provide thirty-days’ advance notice only “before revealing [the plaintiff’s] identity to her alleged traffickers and/or their affiliates.” Id.
The court then evaluated whether to restrict disclosure of the trafficker’s identity and whether the plaintiff’s settlement agreement with him should be designated Attorney’s Eyes Only. The court denied both requests without prejudice, explaining it lacked sufficient information to perform the required two-step analysis. First, the court found the parties had not articulated a “specific harm or prejudice” that would result from disclosure because neither the plaintiff nor Mohammad A. described the settlement agreement’s terms or explained how disclosure would violate the agreement. Id. at *5. Second, because the court could not determine the agreement’s confidentiality terms, it could not balance the public and private interests. It noted that Nevada law, NRS § 10.195, may bar confidentiality in sexual-offense-related settlements, but the court could not analyze that statute’s application without reviewing the agreement in camera. Id. The court therefore denied the requests but invited future briefing.
Finally, the court ordered the parties to meet and confer and submit a stipulated protective order incorporating the approved provisions: (1) pseudonymous pleading through summary judgment and (2) thirty-days’ notice before revealing the plaintiff’s identity to alleged traffickers.
Looking Forward
This decision illustrates the increasingly detailed protective-order landscape confronting hotel franchisors in TVPRA litigation. Courts are refining the line between legitimate victim-protection measures and defendants’ work-product rights. For franchisors, this means developing early strategies for managing protective-order negotiations in cases involving sensitive personal information, alleged criminal actors, and pseudonymous plaintiffs.
The court’s distinction between “contact” and “identity disclosure” is particularly important for franchisors. Human-trafficking suits often require outreach to third parties, including alleged traffickers, witnesses, and associates, as part of a reasonable investigation. Requiring notice before every contact could unintentionally disclose defense strategy and disrupt discovery. Courts are increasingly recognizing this concern and limiting notice requirements to the disclosure of a plaintiff’s identity—not to routine outreach. Franchisors and their counsel may consider structuring protective-order provisions that expressly preserve investigative flexibility while addressing safety considerations.
This decision also underscores the need for franchisors to prepare for pseudonymous litigation. Allegations arising under the TVPRA frequently involve deeply personal trauma, and courts are willing to permit pseudonymity at least through discovery. Franchisors may wish to designate internal representatives to handle such cases under strict confidentiality protocols to avoid unnecessary disclosure and reduce risk.
The court’s analysis of confidentiality provisions in settlement agreements is equally instructive. Franchise systems are increasingly confronted with parallel civil suits, criminal proceedings, and private settlements involving third parties. This ruling demonstrates that courts will demand clear evidence of specific harm before endorsing broad confidentiality restrictions. Moreover, state statutes—like Nevada’s ban on confidentiality in sexual-offense-related settlements—may limit franchisors’ ability to rely on confidential agreements in structuring discovery or defense strategies. Understanding these statutory constraints at the outset may help franchisors position themselves more effectively.
Finally, the decision reflects broader trends in TVPRA claims against franchised hotels. Courts are grappling with sensitive factual allegations while protecting the due-process rights of franchisors whose connection to the alleged trafficking is often contested. This protective-order ruling illustrates a balanced approach: safeguarding the plaintiff’s anonymity and safety while preserving the franchisor’s ability to defend against the claims. As these cases continue to evolve, franchisors may benefit from reviewing their internal policies, documentation standards, and litigation-readiness procedures to ensure that protective-order developments are integrated into their broader risk-management strategies.
This article is based solely on the opinion of the Court in this matter. The author has not conducted any independent investigation into the facts. For the avoidance of doubt, each statement related to the law and facts in this article is drawn from the Court’s opinion in this case.
Thomas O’Connell is a Shareholder at Buchalter APC and Chair of the firm’s Franchise Practice Group. For questions about this article or media inquiries, you can contact Tom at toconnell@buchalter.com.
This communication is not intended to create, and does not create, an attorney-client relationship or any other legal relationship. No statement herein constitutes legal advice, nor should it be relied upon or interpreted as such. This communication is for general informational purposes only and is not a substitute for legal counsel. Readers should not act or refrain from acting based on any information provided without seeking appropriate legal advice specific to their situation. For more information, visit www.buchalter.com.
