Jane Doe v. JRD Partnership, et al.: Court Requires Defendants to Distinguish Between Beneficiary and Perpetrator Liability

August 1, 2025 | United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division | Unpublished Opinion

Executive Summary

In an unpublished memorandum opinion, Judge Eli Richardson of the Middle District of Tennessee denied JRD Partnership’s motion to dismiss claims brought under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). Plaintiff alleged she was trafficked at a Clarksville hotel and that JRD Partnership both directly violated the TVPRA (perpetrator liability) and knowingly benefitted from a trafficking venture (beneficiary liability). The Court emphasized that § 1595(a) contains “two distinct concepts” of liability. Judge Richardson noted that while the Defendant’s briefing responded to the beneficiary-liability theory, it is incorrect to argue that perpetrator liability requires the same showing or to address both theories contemporaneously. Because the complaint plausibly alleged both, and because the defendant had not squarely moved against the perpetrator-liability counts, dismissal was denied.

Relevant Background

Jane Doe alleged that from 2011 to 2014 she was trafficked for commercial sex at the Clarksville America’s Best Inn. She claimed her trafficker repeatedly rented rooms at the property, used them for commercial sex acts, and maintained control through threats and abuse. The Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) described multiple indicators: frequent short-term male visitors, drug paraphernalia left in rooms, refusal of housekeeping, and visible evidence of sex and drug activity.

Doe alleged that JRD Partnership “owned, operated, controlled, and/or managed” the Clarksville property through the America’s Best franchising system. According to the SAC, the company continued to rent rooms despite these conditions, “accommodated the traffickers’ requests for preferred locations,” and “received a monetary benefit every time a room was rented to a trafficker.” On this basis, she alleged both perpetrator and beneficiary liability under § 1595(a). Specifically, Doe pleaded two perpetrator-liability counts based on violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1)–(2), and a separate beneficiary-liability count for knowingly benefitting from participation in a trafficking venture.

JRD Partnership moved to dismiss, challenging the sufficiency of the allegations. Its memorandum, however, referred to plaintiff’s § 1595 claim in the singular and focused its arguments on beneficiary liability, leaving the perpetrator-liability counts largely unaddressed.

Decision

Judge Richardson began with the statute: § 1595(a) authorizes suits against “the perpetrator” of a trafficking violation and also against anyone “whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter.” 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). The Court emphasized that “Section 1595(a) houses two distinct concepts of liability: perpetrator liability and beneficiary liability.” Doe v. JRD P’ship, No. 3:23-cv-00656, slip op. at 11 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 1, 2025) (Richardson, J.).

The Court recognized that “the SAC contains both perpetrator-liability-based claims and a beneficiary-liability-based claim.” Id. at 12. It then clarified: “it is incorrect to treat perpetrator liability as requiring the same showing as beneficiary liability, or to argue them contemporaneously.” Id. at 13. Each theory, Judge Richardson explained, “has distinct elements and must be analyzed separately.” Id.

The Court noted that “defendant’s memorandum referred to only Plaintiff’s Section 1595(a) ‘claim’ in the singular,” id. at 14, meaning that the arguments “responded primarily to the beneficiary-liability claim.” Id. Because of this, the Court did not delve into the perpetrator-liability allegations: “The Court will not dismiss claims that Defendant has not actually placed in issue.” Id. at 15. The practical effect was that the perpetrator-liability counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1)–(2) remained in the case by default.

On beneficiary liability, the Court concluded that Doe’s allegations were sufficient. The SAC alleged that JRD Partnership “continued to rent rooms to traffickers, accommodated the traffickers’ requests for preferred locations, and received a monetary benefit every time a room was rented to a trafficker.” Id. at 16. Judge Richardson held that these allegations “plausibly suggest liability under the expanded scope of liability under the TVPRA as amended.” Id. at 17.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss was denied. The Court reiterated that “beneficiary and perpetrator liability are distinct theories, and the SAC plausibly alleges facts that, if proven, could establish either or both.” Id. at 19.

Looking Forward

TVPRA claims against hoteliers are becoming more and more prevalent, with Westlaw reflecting multiple new federal decisions each week—often at least two—addressing similar allegations. This growth in litigation underscores that courts across jurisdictions are actively developing both perpetrator and beneficiary theories.

For franchisors, hospitality companies, and multi-unit operators, the rise in cases highlights several considerations. First, § 1595(a) permits claims under two separate frameworks. Perpetrator liability arises where a defendant itself allegedly violates § 1591(a), while beneficiary liability attaches where a defendant is alleged to have profited from a venture it “knew or should have known” was engaged in trafficking. Courts are requiring that these theories be analyzed independently, both at the pleading stage and in motion practice.

Second, the Court’s handling of JRD Partnership’s motion illustrates that defendants benefit from tailoring arguments to each theory. A brief that addresses only beneficiary liability may leave perpetrator claims untouched, and one that treats the two interchangeably may not align with how courts view the statute. Distinguishing the elements and applying the appropriate case law to each theory may strengthen defense strategies.

Finally, while the Court here accepted allegations as sufficient to move past the motion-to-dismiss stage, this does not establish liability. It does, however, suggest that businesses should be prepared to demonstrate compliance measures and internal protocols when challenged. Training staff, implementing reporting systems, and documenting responses may reduce risk under both theories.

By leading with the trend of increasing filings and clarifying that courts view perpetrator and beneficiary liability as distinct, Judge Richardson’s opinion illustrates how litigation in this area is expanding and how defendants should adapt their compliance and litigation strategies accordingly.

This article is based solely on the opinion of the Court in this matter. The author has not conducted any independent investigation into the facts. For the avoidance of doubt, each statement related to the law and facts in this article is drawn from the Court’s opinion in this case.

Thomas O’Connell is a Shareholder at Buchalter APC and Chair of the firm’s Franchise Practice Group. For questions about this article or media inquiries, you can contact Tom at toconnell@buchalter.com.

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