September 29, 2025|Publications
September 29, 2025 | Massachusetts Appeals Court | “Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.”
Executive Summary
In a decision authored by Judge Ditkoff, the Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed summary judgment for UMass Memorial Health Care System in a suit by surgical technician Rachelle Jeune alleging religious discrimination under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(1), (1A). The hospital system denied her request for a COVID-19 vaccine religious exemption on the ground that it relied on “demonstrably false information” and argued that (i) her stated beliefs were not religious, (ii) accommodating her would create undue hardship, and (iii) she was not its employee. The Appeals Court held that Jeune’s statements—that her body is a temple of God and that she prayed and received divine guidance not to vaccinate—could be religious in nature; that the record did not establish undue hardship as a matter of law; and that a triable issue exists as to whether UMass Memorial was a joint employer given evidence that the system set policy, maintained HR records, and issued the termination letter. The court therefore reversed and remanded.
Relevant Background
The record reflects that UMass Memorial Health Care describes itself as a system comprising affiliated hospitals and facilities throughout Massachusetts, including UMass Memorial HealthAlliance-Clinton Hospital, Inc., where Jeune began work in July 2021 as a Certified Surgical Technician in the operating room. In September 2021, UMass Memorial announced a system-wide COVID-19 vaccination policy that required employees to obtain a first dose by November 1, 2021, and be fully vaccinated by December 15, 2021, with medical and religious exemptions to be reviewed by system-level committees and any granted exemptions to be followed by a confidential accommodation discussion with HR and the employee’s manager. The policy identified accommodations such as masking with an approved N95, full eye protection, socially distanced meals, and frequent testing; employees denied accommodation could seek other internal positions, and if none were available, would be separated.
On October 6, 2021, Jeune submitted a written request for a religious exemption stating, among other things, that her “body is the temple of God,” that she prays and seeks guidance from God on what she introduces into her body, and that proceeding with the COVID-19 vaccination would be “a sin against my conscience.” She referenced Genesis 1:27 and 1 Corinthians 6:19–20. The system’s religious exemption committee denied the request on October 27, 2021, explaining that the vaccines do not “genetically alter” the body and that “[r]eliance on demonstrably false information cannot be a basis for a religious accommodation.” On December 2, 2021, UMass Memorial’s vice-president of labor and employee relations notified Jeune that she “will be separated from employment with UMass Memorial Health effective today” for failing to be vaccinated. Jeune filed this action in March 2023; the Superior Court granted summary judgment to UMass Memorial, and Jeune appealed.
Decision
The Appeals Court reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Jeune. See Cottrell v. Laidley, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 483, 489, 220 N.E.3d 610 (2023) (quoting Chambers v. RDI Logistics, Inc., 476 Mass. 95, 99, 65 N.E.3d 1 (2016)). Under ch. 151B, § 4(1A), an employer must make reasonable accommodation for an employee’s religious needs unless doing so would impose an undue hardship; the employee first must show a sincerely held religious practice the employer required her to violate, after which the burden shifts to the employer to prove undue hardship. See Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 450 Mass. 327, 335–36, 879 N.E.2d 36 (2008); Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 452 Mass. 674, 676, 896 N.E.2d 1279 (2008).
The court held that Jeune’s statements—that “her body is a temple of God,” that she prays for guidance, and that she received “a distinctive message from my God” not to receive the vaccine—are evidence from which “a trier of fact could determine” her refusal was religious in nature. The court emphasized that “it is not permissible for a judge to determine what is or is not a matter of religious doctrine.” Martin v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 434 Mass. 141, 152, 747 N.E.2d 131 (2001). The opinion aligned with recent federal appellate authority recognizing similar formulations of faith-based vaccine objections. See, e.g., Thornton v. Ipsen Biopharms., Inc., 126 F.4th 76, 82–83 (1st Cir. 2025); Barnett v. Inova Health Care Servs., 125 F.4th 465, 471 (4th Cir. 2025); Sturgill v. Am. Red Cross, 114 F.4th 803, 808 (6th Cir. 2024); Passarella v. Aspirus, Inc., 108 F.4th 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2024).
The Appeals Court also concluded that UMass Memorial failed, on this record, to “conclusively demonstrate that all conceivable accommodations would impose an undue hardship,” particularly because it never engaged in the required search for a reasonable accommodation. Brown, 452 Mass. at 683 (quoting Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 450 Mass. at 342). “An employer’s mere contention that it could not reasonably accommodate an employee is insufficient, as is its mere speculation.” Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 450 Mass. at 336. The system provided no expert affidavit or evidence that accommodations such as masking, eye protection, distancing, and frequent testing would be ineffective in Jeune’s role—while its own policy listed those measures as available accommodations, cutting against any claim that they necessarily posed undue hardship. The court also rejected the notion that generalized “reputation” concerns are enough: “a claim that an accommodation would hurt an employer’s public image is inadequate to show an undue hardship without proof that the employer would suffer concrete harm.” Brown, 452 Mass. at 684–87.
Finally, the Appeals Court addressed whether UMass Memorial was Jeune’s employer. Although she admitted she was directly employed by HealthAlliance-Clinton Hospital, the court held there was a triable question of joint employment. Applying the four-factor framework—“(1) the power to hire and fire; (2) supervision and control over work schedules or conditions; (3) determination of rate and method of payment; and (4) maintenance of employment records”—the court emphasized that “no one factor is dispositive” and that the “totality of the circumstances” controls. Tran v. Jennings Rd. Mgmt. Corp., 104 Mass. App. Ct. 276, 280, 237 N.E.3d 1182 (2024) (quoting Jinks v. Credico (USA) LLC, 488 Mass. 691, 703–04, 177 N.E.3d 509 (2021)).
The system-level touchpoints here were enough to defeat summary judgment: UMass Memorial promulgated the vaccination policy that set a key condition of employment; its vice-president of labor and employee relations issued the termination letter “separat[ing]” Jeune “from employment with UMass Memorial Health”; and HR records in the summary-judgment record were maintained or authenticated at the system level. Those facts contrasted with an affidavit from the same vice-president claiming UMass Memorial “has no employees” and does not hire, fire, or manage affiliate employees—assertions the court found contradicted by his own deposition testimony (including that he himself was a UMass Memorial employee) and by the termination letter. As the Appeals Court noted, such internal inconsistencies “create[d] a factual conflict that must be resolved by the jury.” Benvenuto v. 204 Hanover, LLC, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 140, 146, 143 N.E.3d 467 (2020).
Quoting Commodore v. Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., the court underscored that given “gaps in the record, and the fact-sensitive nature of the joint employer determination, it is not correct to conclude that [Jeune] has no reasonable expectation of proving that [UMass Memorial] was a joint employer.” 63 Mass. App. Ct. 57, 65, 824 N.E.2d 453 (2005). Accordingly, the judgment was reversed.
Looking Forward
The Appeals Court’s opinion underscores several practical lessons for employers, particularly those operating through multi-entity structures or franchise systems. Most notably, the joint employer analysis demonstrates how even limited or tangential system-level involvement in employment decisions can be enough to keep a case alive. Issuing a policy that directly governs working conditions, maintaining HR records at the parent level, or sending a termination letter under the system’s name may all be construed as evidence of shared control over employment. For franchisors, this case highlights the risk that brand-level policies, if they cross into employment conditions rather than system standards, can create exposure.
The ruling also illustrates how Massachusetts courts approach religious accommodation disputes. Employers cannot dismiss a request as insincere simply because it incorporates scientifically inaccurate reasoning. The question is whether the employee has articulated a belief rooted in religious practice, and the sincerity of that belief is for a jury to assess. Equally important, employers must be prepared to substantiate any claim of undue hardship with evidence, not conjecture. Policies that already contemplate accommodations like masking, testing, or distancing may undermine attempts to argue that such accommodations are unworkable.
Ultimately, Jeune reinforces that courts will not resolve factual disputes at summary judgment where credibility, sincerity, and inconsistent evidence are at issue. For franchisors and parent entities, the decision is a reminder to carefully calibrate brand-level requirements, ensure consistent testimony and documentation across corporate entities, and maintain a clear record distinguishing system oversight from employer control.
This article is based solely on the opinion of the Court in this matter. The author has not conducted any independent investigation into the facts. For the avoidance of doubt, each statement related to the law and facts in this article is drawn from the Court’s opinion in this case.
Thomas O’Connell is a Shareholder at Buchalter APC and Chair of the firm’s Franchise Practice Group. For questions about this article or media inquiries, you can contact Tom at toconnell@buchalter.com.
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