September 22, 2025|Publications
September 22, 2025 | United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division | Unpublished Opinion
Executive Summary
In an unpublished opinion, Judge Algenon L. Marbley of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied summary judgment for three hotel defendants—MGH Hospitality, Ash Management, and S&S Airport Motel—in a civil sex trafficking case under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2018). Plaintiff alleged she was trafficked between 2013 and 2015 at several hotels in Columbus, Ohio. The defendants argued that the absence of reservation records, Plaintiff’s efforts to avoid detection, and her inconsistent recollections defeated her claims. Judge Marbley disagreed, holding that renting hotel rooms could itself satisfy both the “knowing benefit” and “participation in a venture” elements of § 1595, and that constructive knowledge was enough for liability under the statute. M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-00849, 2025 WL 2696500, at *10–13 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 22, 2025) (unpublished). The ruling allows the case to proceed to trial and underscores how undefined statutory terms expose both hotel operators and franchisors to expansive liability theories.
Relevant Background
M.A. filed this action in 2019, the first in what has since grown to more than seventy sex trafficking suits in the Southern District of Ohio. Id. at *1. She alleged that she was trafficked by two men, identified as L.R. and L.W., at Days Inn, Comfort Inn, and Crowne Plaza properties. L.W. later pled guilty to sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2018) and was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Id.
According to Plaintiff, her traffickers paid for rooms in cash, requested rooms near exits, refused housekeeping, and left trash cans “contain[ing] an extraordinary number of used condoms.” Id. at *4. She further alleged that she was visibly bruised and deteriorating, and that staff ignored her “desperate pleas and screams for help” after violent incidents. Id. She testified that “from Day 1 … there was 30–40 people coming in in a day to one hotel room,” which she alleged should have alerted staff. Id. at *17.
By 2025, only three defendants remained: MGH, Ash, and S&S. Each moved for summary judgment. They argued that Plaintiff’s own testimony defeated her claims. She admitted she often kept her head down, avoided eye contact, and deliberately tried not to be noticed when entering or leaving the hotels. Id. at *11. Defendants pointed to her inability to describe features of the hotels—such as restaurants, pools, or parking lots—that, in their view, no guest could have missed. Id. at *10–11. They also emphasized that no reservation records bore Plaintiff’s name, and in some cases none bore the names of her alleged traffickers. Id. at *11–12.
Defendants further argued that Plaintiff’s testimony was inconsistent with her pleadings, and that her memory lapses, which she attributed to PTSD, undermined her credibility. Id. at *10. They maintained that, at most, they were aware of prostitution generally, and that constructive knowledge derived from trafficking concerns nationwide should not suffice. One defendant asserted that the TVPRA “does not impose a legal duty for any business to stop or even to prevent human trafficking,” nor does it punish hotels for “generally not knowing or understanding signs of human trafficking.” Id. at *2.
Decision
To establish liability under the TVPRA’s civil remedy provision, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant knowingly benefitted, financially or otherwise; (2) from participation in a venture; and (3) that the defendant knew or should have known violated the Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2018). Judge Marbley analyzed each element in turn.
On the “knowing benefit” element, the court reaffirmed that “the rental of a room constitutes a financial benefit from a relationship with the trafficker sufficient to meet this element of the §1595(a) standard.” M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d 959, 965 (S.D. Ohio 2019); accord M.A., 2025 WL 2696500, at *11. Defendants argued that no reservation records bore Plaintiff’s name and, in some cases, none bore the names of her alleged traffickers. Id. at *9–10. The court noted, however, that records did show L.W. rented rooms at one property during the relevant period, and disputes about the absence of records went to the weight of the evidence rather than dispositive sufficiency. Id.
On “participation in a venture,” the court reasoned that renting a room not only provided the benefit but also facilitated the trafficking. Judge Marbley explained: “Participation simply means taking part. To require the kind of blatant, proactive acts that Defendants propose … would be to discard the ‘should have known’ language in Section 1595.” Id. at *15. He further emphasized that “sex trafficking ventures cannot operate without access to physical spaces, and the act of giving a trafficker a hotel room is providing them with that space.” Id. at *16. While “benefit” and “participation” are distinct statutory elements, Judge Marbley concluded that in the hotel context, the same conduct—renting rooms—could be viewed as satisfying both, since it involves providing a service (participation) in exchange for a payment (benefit). Id. at *15–16.
Judge Marbley also rejected contrary interpretations from other courts, particularly in the Eleventh Circuit. In Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 21 F.4th 714 (11th Cir. 2021), the Eleventh Circuit held that hotel franchisors must have taken part in a “common undertaking or enterprise involving risk and potential profit” with traffickers to satisfy the “participation in a venture” element, emphasizing that “observing something is not the same as participating in it.” Id. at 724–25. Likewise, in C.B. v. Naseeb Invs., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 3d 1338 (N.D. Ga. 2024), a district court concluded that room rentals and evidence of prostitution on the property were insufficient without some overt act showing that the hotel advanced the traffickers’ enterprise. Judge Marbley criticized such approaches as inconsistent with the statutory text, opining that to demand proactive conduct beyond room rentals would be “to discard the ‘should have known’ language in Section 1595.” M.A., 2025 WL 2696500, at *15. He added that such a construction is “far more limiting than [Section 1595’s] language requires” and suggested that the Eleventh Circuit’s framework leaves “constructive knowledge” with no role to play. Id. at *15–16. In contrast, Judge Marbley reaffirmed that under the plain text of the statute, constructive knowledge is enough, and renting rooms to traffickers may suffice for both the benefit and participation elements. Id. at *16.
On the “knew or should have known” element, the court held that Plaintiff need only show constructive knowledge under a negligence standard. Id. at *20 (citing M.A., 425 F. Supp. 3d at 966). Plaintiff testified that the sheer volume of people entering her room, the disheveled condition, and trash cans full of condoms were obvious indicators. M.A., 2025 WL 2696500, at *20–21. Defendants countered that Plaintiff’s inconsistent memory of the hotels undermined her claims. Id. at *12. Ordinarily, lapses in memory alone do not create a genuine dispute of material fact. See Pratt v. Brown Mach. Co., 855 F.2d 1225, 1233 (6th Cir. 1988). Credibility determinations, by contrast, are reserved for the jury at summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Here, the court treated the inconsistencies as credibility issues, deferring to the jury in light of expert testimony attributing Plaintiff’s lapses to PTSD. M.A., 2025 WL 2696500, at *12. As to the legal standard, Judge Marbley reaffirmed that constructive knowledge may substitute for actual knowledge under § 1595’s negligence framework. Id. at *20; M.A., 425 F. Supp. 3d at 966. And while the absence of booking records may be probative, the court concluded it was not sufficient on its own to warrant summary judgment. M.A., 2025 WL 2696500, at *9–10. At bottom, the court held that the disputes raised in this case presented triable issues, underscoring how broadly it interpreted § 1595. Id. at *13.
Finally, the court rejected defendants’ policy arguments that imposing liability based on room rentals and constructive knowledge would create an “unworkable burden” on hotel operators. Judge Marbley dismissed those concerns as a “parade of horribles,” writing: “Hyperbole, however, is not reasoning, and Defendants’ reasoning is ill-informed.” Id. at *2. He emphasized that Congress had “repeatedly and deliberately chosen to expand the scope of liability for sex trafficking conduct” and that if there is a “defect—if defect it is—it is inherent in the statute as written, and its correction must lie with Congress.” Id. at *2, 16 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499–500 (1985)).
Looking Forward
Judge Marbley stressed that the breadth of liability under § 1595 reflects the statute itself, not judicial overreach. Unless Congress provides clearer definitions, courts will continue applying expansive interpretations, leaving many disputes to juries instead of being resolved at summary judgment.
What Congress Should Do
Congress could bring clarity by defining terms such as “participation in a venture” and “benefitting.” Some courts, such as the Eleventh Circuit in Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 21 F.4th 714 (11th Cir. 2021), have required evidence of a “common undertaking” with traffickers, rather than treating routine commercial transactions as sufficient. Codifying a narrower standard would reduce inconsistent outcomes and prevent ordinary room rentals from being treated as dispositive evidence of both participation and benefit. Such clarification would also avoid unintended consequences, such as discouraging hotels from serving underprivileged guests who pay in cash or present other characteristics that might be misconstrued as “red flags.”
What This Means for Hotels and Franchisors Until Congress Acts
Until Congress acts, hotels and franchisors remain vulnerable to broad liability theories under the TVPRA. Judge Marbley’s decision shows how constructive knowledge, credibility disputes, and even the absence of formal records are likely to be left to juries. For hotel operators, this means more cases will reach trial, where the risks of large verdicts are substantial.
For franchisors, the implications are even sharper. In Doe v. Hilton, allegations that Hilton controlled booking systems, training, and reporting obligations were enough to survive a motion to dismiss, even though the alleged trafficking occurred at a franchisee-operated DoubleTree. No. 5:22-cv-323, 2025 WL 4155057, at *7–9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2025) (unpublished). Likewise, in A.M. v. Wyndham, the court held that Wyndham’s receipt of royalties and operational control could support constructive knowledge allegations sufficient to defeat dismissal. No. 2:22-cv-3185, 2024 WL 1244192, at *8–10 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2024) (unpublished). These cases demonstrate that franchisors may be drawn into litigation not because they directly facilitated trafficking, but because ordinary franchise practices—royalty structures, brand standards, and oversight—can be reframed as evidence of both benefit and participation.
In short, the decision illustrates how undefined statutory terms, combined with expansive judicial interpretation, place both franchisees and franchisors in a precarious position. Until Congress clarifies the TVPRA, franchisors face the real possibility that routine aspects of brand management will continue to be tested before juries under theories of constructive knowledge and beneficiary liability.
This article is based solely on the opinion of the Court in this matter. The author has not conducted any independent investigation into the facts. For the avoidance of doubt, each statement related to the law and facts in this article is drawn from the Court’s opinion in this case.
Thomas O’Connell is a Shareholder at Buchalter APC and Chair of the firm’s Franchise Practice Group. For questions about this article or media inquiries, you can contact Tom at toconnell@buchalter.com.
Joshua M. Robbins is also a Shareholder at Buchalter, Co-Chair of the White Collar & Investigations Practice Group, and a former federal prosecutor, with experience litigating TVPRA cases. You can contact him at jrobbins@buchalter.com.
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