August 01, 2025|Publications
August 1, 2025 | Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Sixth Division | Unpublished Opinion
Executive Summary
In an unpublished opinion, Justice Gamrath of the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, affirmed a trial court’s order certifying a plaintiff class against The UPS Store, Inc. (“TUPSS”), its franchisee Generation I, LLC (operator of UPS Store #7181), and co-owner Rex Ingram. Plaintiff Reba Shavers alleged she was overcharged for notary services when a $4 “clerical fee” was added to the $1 statutory fee, in violation of the Illinois Notary Public Act. She claimed that TUPSS exerted control over notary pricing and conspired with its franchisee to permit unlawful fees. Defendants argued that individualized inquiries defeated commonality and that TUPSS had no role in setting fees. The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding adequacy, commonality, predominance, and appropriateness under section 2-801 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and affirmed certification of a class limited to customers of UPS Store #7181. Shavers v. UPS Store, Inc., 2025 IL App (1st) 241034-U.
Relevant Background
Shavers alleged that in April 2020 she visited UPS Store #7181, operated by franchisee Generation I, LLC, and asked co-owner Rex Ingram to notarize two documents. She claims the store charged her $1 per document plus a $4 clerical fee, even though no one performed clerical services. In her complaint, she further alleged that defendants violated the Illinois Notary Act, the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, and profited unjustly from the fees. She also alleged that all defendants agreed to a conspiracy to charge excessive notary fees, and that TUPSS exercised oversight and control over franchisee pricing practices. Defendants denied these claims and argued that each franchisee independently set notary fees, and that TUPSS neither directed, approved, nor audited those prices. The trial court dismissed most of Shavers’s claims against TUPSS but allowed her civil conspiracy claim to move forward. Shavers then sought certification of both a plaintiff class of customers statewide and a defendant class of Illinois franchisees. On April 11, 2024, the court denied certification of both the proposed defendant class and the broader statewide plaintiff class, but it certified a narrower class of customers who allegedly paid notary fees exceeding the statutory maximum at UPS Store #7181.
Decision
The appellate court reviewed the trial court’s decision under section 2-801 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which sets out the four prerequisites for class certification: numerosity, commonality and predominance, adequacy, and appropriateness. Smith v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 223 Ill. 2d 441, 447 (2006). The court emphasized that certification falls within the trial court’s discretion and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Ramirez v. Midway Moving & Storage, Inc., 378 Ill. App. 3d 51, 53 (2007).
The parties did not dispute numerosity, and the record showed that numerous customers allegedly paid the same $1 plus $4 pricing structure for notary services at UPS Store #7181, making joinder impractical. On the question of commonality and predominance, defendants argued that liability depended on individualized inquiries into whether each customer had been told about the clerical fee and whether they consented to pay it. The appellate court rejected this argument, noting that Ingram testified he personally handled nearly all notary transactions before August 2020 and applied the same pricing and procedure with each customer. The court explained that “the question at the heart of this matter” was whether defendants conspired to charge illegal notary fees, and “[i]f Shavers successfully shows a conspiracy to charge illegal notary fees, it will all but resolve the class claims.” Shavers, 2025 IL App (1st) 241034-U, ¶ 20. Because the alleged conduct arose from uniform practices, the court distinguished the case from those where liability turned on varying oral misrepresentations. See Arca v. Colo. Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi., 265 Ill. App. 3d 498, 501 (1994).
Defendants also challenged the adequacy of Shavers as class representative, asserting that she lacked a viable claim under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The appellate court disagreed, holding that adequacy does not turn on whether defendants can disprove allegations at the class certification stage. The court emphasized that defendants’ effort to use deposition testimony to attack Shavers’s account amounted to “a summary judgment-type argument that is not appropriate on a motion for class certification.” Cruz v. Unilock Chi., 383 Ill. App. 3d 752, 764 (2008). The court found that Shavers’s interests were aligned with the class, that she actively participated in the litigation, and that her counsel was qualified to represent the class.
The appellate court also upheld the trial court’s determination that a class action was an appropriate method to resolve the controversy. It stressed that the amount of recovery for each customer would likely be small, making individual actions impractical, and that class treatment was necessary to provide an efficient and fair adjudication. On this basis, the court concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in certifying the limited class of customers who allegedly paid excessive notary fees at UPS Store #7181.
Looking Forward
This decision illustrates the challenges franchisors may face when plaintiffs seek to tie brand-level oversight to alleged statutory violations at the unit level. Even though the court did not resolve the merits of the claims, its affirmation of certification shows that allegations of uniform pricing practices at a single store may be enough to satisfy predominance. For franchisors, the case highlights the importance of distinguishing brand standards from franchisee autonomy in areas such as pricing. Allegations of franchisor “approval” of local practices—even when disputed—can be leveraged at the certification stage. Franchisors may wish to ensure franchisee training and materials clearly delineate independent decision-making authority while also educating operators on statutory compliance. Doing so may reduce the risk that plaintiffs frame franchise system oversight as evidence of conspiratorial conduct.
Thomas O’Connell is a Shareholder at Buchalter APC and Chair of the firm’s Franchise Practice Group. For questions about this article or media inquiries, you can contact Tom at toconnell@buchalter.com.
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