July 28, 2026|Client Alerts
By Steven Churchwell and Dalton Mabery
In Trump v. Slaughter, the United States Supreme Court held that commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) are removable by the President notwithstanding statutory for-cause removal protections. This ruling raises major questions about the continued viability of removal protections at other independent agencies and has the potential to substantially impact how agencies function and the entities they regulate.
Key Takeaways
- The Supreme Court held that the President could remove FTC commissioners notwithstanding statutory for-cause removal protections.
- The decision substantially narrows the continuing force of Humphrey’s Executor.
- The ruling may invite challenges to similar removal protections at other independent agencies.
- Regulated entities should anticipate that agency leadership, enforcement priorities, and regulatory agendas may become more closely aligned with—and more susceptible to changes in—presidential administrations.
The Background
In 1933, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt fired FTC Commissioner William E. Humphrey because Humphrey’s political philosophy clashed with Roosevelt’s. In a letter to Humphrey, Roosevelt asked him to resign, writing, “I do not feel that your mind and my mind go along together on either the policies or the administering of the Federal Trade Commission.” When he refused, Roosevelt fired him.
However, the FTC Act prohibited removing a commissioner unless there was “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” The dispute came before the United States Supreme Court, and in a unanimous opinion, the Court held that Congress’s for-cause removal protections on the President’s ability to remove an FTC commissioner was constitutional. Therefore, President Roosevelt’s decision to remove Humphrey was unlawful.
But two subsequent decisions whittled away Humphrey’s removal protections for agency directors. In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (2010), the Supreme Court held that the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s structure was unconstitutional because the board members were insulated by two layers of for-cause removal protections. And in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2020), the Supreme Court held that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s structure—a single-director removable only for cause—violated separation of powers principles.
Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook
Much like Mr. Humphrey, Rebecca Slaughter was a commissioner on the FTC when President Trump removed her. She challenged the removal as a contravention of Humphrey’s Executor. Writing for a 6–3 majority, Chief Justice Roberts held that the FTC commissioner’s for-cause removal protections violated the Constitution. The Court reasoned that the FTC wields executive power, and because Article II of the Constitution vests “[t]he executive power” in a President of the United States, any individual that exercises that power must be answerable to—and subject to removal by—the President. Therefore, any restrictions on the President’s ability to remove those individuals violates separation of powers and is unconstitutional.
In a case decided the same day, however, the Supreme Court suggested that at least some independent agencies may be different than the FTC. The issue in Trump v. Cook was whether Lisa Cook—a member of the Board of Governors that President Trump sought to remove—committed an act that was sufficient to constitute being fired “for cause.” In deciding that question on a preliminary basis, the Court signaled that removal protections applicable to the Federal Reserve may present distinct constitutional considerations than those in Slaughter because the Federal Reserve is a unique historical entity that follows in the tradition of the First and Second National Banks of the United States.
Therefore, Cook signals that not every independent agency will be subject to the President’s at-will removal. But the precise scope of that exception—and which agencies may fall within it—will likely become the subject of substantial future litigation.
The Impact
President Roosevelt’s attitude toward Mr. Humphrey explains why these decisions matter for regulated entities.
Independent agencies have historically provided a degree of continuity across different administrations because their directors often served fixed, staggered terms and were required to have balanced representation of both political parties. But unlike Roosevelt’s inability to remove Humphrey when he was not running the FTC in accordance with Roosevelt’s policy preferences, now, agency directors whose policy objectives diverge from the President’s may be more vulnerable to removal. And while the FTC was the agency at-issue in both Humphrey’s and Slaughter, the Court’s reasoning may have broad implications for other independent agencies that exercise executive power, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, and the National Labor Relations Board.
But even after Slaughter, administrative agencies are not free to act sporadically or impose unsupported policy reversals. All agencies are still constrained by the Administrative Procedure Act, and courts can invalidate agency action that is arbitrary and capricious. Nonetheless, the FTC, the NLRB, the SEC, and other agencies may now be more influenced than before by the President, leading to increased uncertainty about future agency regulations and their priorities.
What Clients Should Do
Companies that are regulated by independent agencies should:
- Monitor Executive Branch leadership changes following presidential transitions;
- Identify ongoing rulemaking that may be vulnerable to modification or withdrawal;
- Evaluate whether business strategies rely on regulatory positions that are subject to change under future administrations;
- Reassess enforcement and litigation risk in light of evolving agency priorities; and
- Factor regulatory volatility into long-term compliance planning.
Steve Churchwell is a member of the Government Affairs and Regulatory Law practice group in Buchalter’s Sacramento and Nashville offices.
Dalton Mabery is a Summer Associate in Buchalter’s Sacramento office.
This communication is not intended to create or constitute, nor does it create or constitute, an attorney-client or any other legal relationship. No statement in this communication constitutes legal advice nor should any communication herein be construed, relied upon, or interpreted as legal advice. This communication is for general information purposes only regarding recent legal developments of interest, and is not a substitute for legal counsel on any subject matter. No reader should act or refrain from acting on the basis of any information included herein without seeking appropriate legal advice on the particular facts and circumstances affecting that reader. For more information, visit www.buchalter.com.
