Cox v. Sony – A New Landscape in Contributory Copyright Infringement

Last week, the Supreme Court issued a highly anticipated ruling on the Cox Communications, Inc. et. al., v. Sony Music Entertainment, et. al. case, No. 24-171, slip op. (U.S. Mar. 25, 2026). This case has altered the landscape of contributory liability for willful copyright infringement.

The Court’s ruling clarified the requirement of intent in contributory copyright infringement claims. Liability can be shown only if the contributorily infringing party induced the infringement or provided services tailored to the infringement. Plaintiffs now have reduced causes of actions for which they can allege defendants willfully infringed their copyrights under a contributory liability theory.

This case centered around Cox continuing to provide Internet access to users who were alleged by Sony Music to have repeatedly infringed their copyrighted works/songs. Cox is an internet service provider with around 6 million users. Sony Music, in an effort to crack down on internet users infringing on their copyrights, enlisted a software program that would detect and trace allegedly infringing activity to a particular internet user’s IP address. If the program detected infringing activity, it sent notices identifying the IP address where the infringing activity occurred. The program sent Cox over 160,000 notices.

Sony Music sued Cox for contributory infringement, arguing that Cox willfully infringed Sony Music’s copyright by “continuing to provide Internet service to subscribers whose IP addresses [Cox] knew were associated with infringement.” Sony Music also sued Cox for vicarious copyright infringement. At trial, the jury found for Sony Music, finding that Cox was contributorily and vicariously liable for the infringements to Sony Music’s copyrights. The jury also found that Cox’s infringement was willful, and awarded Sony Music $1 billion in damages. Cox appealed this decision to the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the jury’s finding as to contributory liability, but reversed as to the jury’s finding for vicarious liability. Cox then petitioned the Supreme Court as to contributory liability, which the Court granted.

The Court was asked to determine whether an internet service provider (ISP) who provided internet service was liable for willful copyright infringement under a contributory infringement theory when the ISP continued to provide known copyright infringers Internet access.

The Court unanimously held that an ISP cannot be found liable for willful copyright infringement by continuing to provide Internet access to known copyright infringers. The majority explained that, a “[provider of a service is contributorily liable for the user’s infringement only if [the provider] intended that the provided service be used for infringement.” Id. at 7. However, the Court now establishes that there are “only two forms of secondary liability for copyright infringement” under the Copyright Act. It held that the intent requirement for contributory liability can be shown “only if the [contributorily infringing] party induced the infringement or the provided services is tailored to that infringement.”

“A provider induces infringement if it actively encourages infringement through specific acts” (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grosker Ltd.). “A service is tailored to infringement[, on the other hand,] if it is ‘not capable of ‘substantial or ‘commercially significant’ noninfringing uses.” In Cox, the Court found that Cox did not induce infringement because there was no evidence that Cox induced or encouraged its subscribers to infringe on Sony Music’s copyrights and often “repeatedly discouraged copyright infringement[.]” The Court similarly found that Cox’s service was not tailored to copyright infringement because it “simply provided Internet access, which is used for many purposes other than copyright infringement.” Because the Court found no evidence of these intent requirements, the Court found that “contributory liability cannot rest only on a provider’s knowledge of infringement and insufficient action to prevent it,” and reversed the Fourth Circuit’s ruling.

This ruling raises the bar for claims of contributory infringement of copyrights. Now, in order to prevail on a claim for contributory infringement of a copyright, one has to show that there was intent to infringe the copyright, in that the party induced the infringement or provided specific services tailored to infringe the copyrights. Now that there is a clear intent requirement, plaintiffs cannot simply make a claims based on theories that a party had knowledge of the infringement and should have done more to stop it.

The ruling will affect copyright liability theories against generative AI companies. It makes it difficult to make a claim against AI companies whose software may be prompted to generate potentially infringing content. Most generative AI software, like an internet service provider, has significant non-infringing uses—the software does not induce infringement, nor is it tailored to infringe copyrights. Thus, copyright owners may be out of luck in asserting claims against AI companies and they must go after the users who have created the content using generative AI.

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